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iExecutive Summary
The process of ever deepening and widening integration in Europe, in which the EU has functioned as
the main vehicle as well as a catalyst, contrasts sharply with the disintegration experienced in the Balkans
during the 1990s. Balkanisation needs to be halted; and for this to happen, the international community,
and the EU in particular, will have to assume greater responsibilities in direct co-operation with the
peoples of the region.
The Stability Pact can provide the appropriate framework for the adoption and implementation of
concrete measures aiming at stability, democracy and economic prosperity in the Balkans. This is the
next stage which should be completed sooner rather than later.
This paper argues that reconstruction in the Balkans needs to be understood not just as physical and
economic reconstruction but also as social and institutional reconstruction. It therefore combines an
examination of security, political and economic issues, leading to the appropriate policy measures. The
region is treated as a whole, although relatively more emphasis is placed on the Western Balkans which
have been directly affected by the long and bloody process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia.
The Present Situation...
The aftermath of the war in Kosovo, has resulted in considerable political uncertainty in the whole area
of the Western Balkans. This is further exacerbated by economic and social conditions which generate a
vested interest in violence. The negative consequences of the war and the continuing political uncertainty
tend to spill over in the wider region of the Balkans.
There are two major security problems in the Western Balkans today:
· no clear borders
· weak application of the rule of law
These are both closely related to the undemocratic character of regimes in the region. Formal
democracy, through paper constitutions and relatively free elections, is not at all incompatible with what
we refer to as ‘soft totalitarianism’. The Milosevic regime in Serbia is a prominent example, although by
no means the only one in the region. Democratic forces do exist; but they have been greatly weakened
and marginalised in conditions of war.
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On the economic front, there are important similarities among all the post-communist countries in the
Balkans, despite the considerable diversity which is manifested, first and foremost, in levels of GDP. All
transition countries in the Balkans are characterised by:
· unsustainable external deficits
· dangerously high levels of unemployment
· large and often unsustainable fiscal deficits
· low and spasmodic growth
· rapid de-industrialisation
· low credibility of the banking sector and the financial system in general
· slow and/or inefficient (indeed corrupt, in many cases) privatisation
· weak economic institutions and rules.
The economic performance of all transition economies in the Balkans has been worse than in Central
Europe and the Baltic countries. The war in former Yugoslavia has undoubtedly had an important
negative effect; but it has surely not been the only factor. The lack of political consensus and weak
institutions have played a major role. The experience of post-communist transition in the Balkans
suggests, among other things, that corporate governance can hardly function without proper functioning
of public governance. The restructuring of state capacity should therefore be a central element in any
reconstruction programme in the Balkans. A small state should not be confused with a weak state.
The experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina can provide some useful lessons in terms of the reconstruction
effort likely to be undertaken by the international community, and the EU in particular, for the region as a
whole in the context of the Stability Pact:
· The process of creating an economically and politically viable entity has proven to be
long and painful. Even more so when the constitutional arrangements, most notably
the multiple layers of government provided for by the Dayton agreement, tend to act
as an impediment to reconstruction and development.
· Without the necessary conditions for private investment, both domestic and foreign,
large inflows of foreign assistance lead to an aid dependent economy. This is clearly
not sustainable. Availability of cheap credit and an active restructuring of existing
enterprises are among the conditions necessary.
· The persistence of very high unemployment undermines political and social stability.
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…And What Needs to Be Done
Reconstruction in the Balkans needs to be perceived principally as a conflict prevention strategy, which
should focus on restoring the rule of law as well as strengthening the process of democratisation. The
latter depends in turn on security, both physical and material: an atmosphere of fear and insecurity
sustains extremist rulers and generates conflict.
For some time at least, security in the region will require the active involvement of the international
community which should be expected to undertake both internal and external security tasks in Kosovo
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as elsewhere, if and when the need arises. This might well be in the
form of an international civil presence or an OSCE security presence.
Temporary political arrangements, notably through the creation of ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ protectorates, are
costly, especially in terms of reconstruction and sustainable economic development. Issues of status and
borders in the Balkans need to be settled sooner rather than later; but they cannot be imposed from
outside. Any number of solutions is indeed possible. What is absolutely crucial, however, is that a
permanent political solution is both legal and legitimate: acceptable to the parties involved, the
neighbouring countries and the international community. Unfortunately, the necessary conditions are not
yet there; and they must be created gradually.
Reconstruction and regional co-operation in the Balkans requires the inclusion and active participation of
Serbia. This means that a change of regime in Belgrade, combined with a deeper process of
democratisation of Serbia, would have wider positive consequences for the region as a whole.
Through the use of selective sanctions and humanitarian assistance, the international community can do
much to help in this direction. In order to do so, it needs to:
· distinguish between the regime and Serbian society
· provide help directly to democratic forces and representatives of civil society
· adopt a wide definition of humanitarian assistance which, while sidelining the central
government, should help to minimise human suffering, especially during the difficult
winter months.
The creation of a democratic and safe society - safe for everybody including, of course, the Serb
minority – should be the aim for Kosovo. The UN has a very difficult task ahead of it. It should focus on
the provision of security, minority rights, the organisation of elections, and support for civil society.
The process of democratisation in the Balkans will require the strengthening of civil society, which is
generally underdeveloped in the countries of the region. This will be one way of countering the pervasive
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tendencies of authoritarianism, extreme nationalism and criminalisation, which have become dominant
elements in recent years.
Priorities for assistance to civil society throughout the region as a whole should include:
· investment in education, extensive reform of curriculums and the integration of higher
education institutions in European networks of co-operation
· the development of independent mass media
· devolution of power and the strengthening of government  at the local level
· the creation of appropriate regional forums for co-operation among entrepreneurs
and trade unionists
· assistance to NGOs
· support for religious institutions in their advocacy of tolerance and their opposition to
extreme forms of nationalism.
Economic recovery in the post-communist Balkans and the progressive integration of all the countries of
the region into the European system present major challenges. There are no easy or simple solutions.
Policy makers need to tackle, among other things, the dramatic decline, or even disappearance, of
productive capacity; the small size of markets, whether national or even regional; and the high level of
investment risks. The formulation of economic policy in the countries concerned will need to take some
important factors into consideration.
Monetary policy should aim, first and foremost, at a low nominal and real interest rate, which should be
convergent over a reasonable period of time, to that of the EU. Experience with currency boards is very
mixed. A serious deflationary risk is involved. If central banks were to tie their hands, euroisation would
then be preferable, especially if accompanied by domestic financial reforms and external financial aid.
Exchange rate policy, in conjunction with monetary policy, should aim at an optimal mix between
exchange rate and interest rate flexibility in order to deal with internal and external shocks. Support for
the export sector as a prime motor of development and integration into the EU should be a major
consideration. Thus, fixed exchange rates (and euroisation) should ideally be long-term targets achieved
after a period of transition and adjustment in order to avoid an excessive real appreciation of domestic
currencies.
Fiscal policy should aim at lower and thus sustainable budget deficits. Taxes should be simple,
business- and employment-friendly as well as convergent with the EU, and VAT should be progressively
adopted.  The long term sustainability of social security arrangements should be high on the agenda.
vTrade liberalisation should extend both towards the EU and all the other countries of the region.
There should be an asymmetry in favour of Balkan countries in any timetable of trade liberalisation with
the EU. The protection of Balkan economies should as a rule not extend beyond 5-7 years and should
aim to minimise special protection and rent-seeking in general. The main aims of trade policy should be
allocational and developmental, not fiscal.
In view of the very high level of unemployment in the region, labour market policies will be
essential. They will need to bring down barriers to employment, legalise black market employment
wherever possible, and focus on training and development activities. Prime consideration should be given
to tackling long-term and youth unemployment.
Investment policies need to address more effectively the persisting problem of high risk. They
should be complemented by a more active restructuring of the industrial sector. Specific risks need to be
identified and financial institutions set up in order to insure investors against these risks. This can be done
either via the existing international financial institutions, through the European institutions or through a
regional development bank that would be institutionally connected with the corresponding banks in
Washington and Europe. Capital account transactions should also be liberalised gradually with the view
of securing sustainable and long-term financial inflows rather than short-term capital movements.
Experience suggests that financial reform is of key importance for transition economies. Lessons can
be learned concerning the methods and timing of bank restructuring and the sound development of other
institutions of financial intermediation. Particular attention must be given to close monitoring and the
setting up of regulatory agencies and to the building-up of the required expertise.
The process of reconstruction and development requires large investments in human and social
capabilities. Significant resources should therefore be devoted to technical assistance and the building of
institutions. External assistance will also be vital in supporting and reforming social security systems,
which are close to collapse in virtually all countries in the region.
The reconstruction of the Balkans will require close and effective co-operation between the international
community and the peoples of the region. In this respect, the role of the European Union is absolutely
crucial.
Until now, the action undertaken by the EU in the Balkans has been too little and too late. The more
remote the prospect of membership, the smaller the influence the EU can exert on other European
countries. This has been particularly true of its influence to date in the Balkans. And furthermore, given
the underdeveloped nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), when the guns began
to sound in the region, the EU had little or nothing to say.
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This needs to change. Helping to create the conditions for security, democracy and economic prosperity
in the Balkans should be a high priority for the Union. Reconstruction should also be intimately linked
with the progressive integration of all the countries in the region into the European system, leading to full
membership of the EU. This will inevitably be a lengthy process during which the EU will require:
· political will
· financial resources
· innovative ideas.
Key elements of the EU strategy for the Balkans may include the following:
· generosity and flexibility combined with conditionality and continuous monitoring
· a regional approach compatible with differential treatment of countries as a means of
rewarding success, as long as this is based on generally applicable and transparent
rules
· Progressive integration into the EU together with increasing co-operation at the
regional level in the Balkans, viewed as mutually reinforcing processes.
In more concrete terms, EU policy towards the Balkans may include some of the following components:
Trade liberalisation: immediate tariff-free access for industrial exports from the region accompanied
by a generous increase in agricultural export quotas, culminating in complete liberalisation. Balkan
countries should be offered a relatively short transition period to liberalise trade with the EU. As regards
intra-regional liberalisation, this could take effect more or less immediately.
Progressive regulatory alignment  with the EU, viewed as part of institution building in the countries
concerned and also as part of the necessary adaptation prior to full membership. It should not, however,
end up imposing too high an economic cost for producers, especially in the early stages.
Euroisation could have considerable symbolic significance as a way of linking the Balkans with EMU.
However, it should not happen immediately and without some important pre-conditions having been
fulfilled. Otherwise, it would risk adding yet another heavy constraint on economic development for the
countries of the region.
Economic aid should be an integral part of the package to be offered by the EU to all the countries in
the region. Annual transfers of the order of 3-5 billion euros for the whole area of the post-communist
Balkans should be within the limits of the financial perspectives extending to the year 2006. The
European Agency for Reconstruction should have its responsibilities extended to the wider
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region of the Balkans. It should also acquire a co-ordinating role among all the other donor institutions
involved in order to ensure the efficient use of resources.
An indicative list of priorities for EU economic aid may include:
· investment in public infrastructure
· restructuring of the financial sector
· encouragement of private investment and the generation of new employment
· institution building
· development of civil society and NGOs
· promotion of Balkan co-operation, starting with areas of low politics.
Co-operation between the EU and the countries in the Balkans should extend to justice and home
affairs, including notably visas and immigration as well the fight against organised crime and drug
trafficking.
Last but not least, EU policy towards the Balkans should include a strong institutional dimension,
with two different but closely interconnected elements, notably the bilateral (between the EU and
individual countries), and the regional.
In conclusion, the reconstruction of the Balkans constitutes a major challenge for the international
community, the European Union as well as the peoples of the region, who will be, of course, most
directly affected. Reconstruction has different dimensions, physical and economic as well as social and
institutional. Concentrating on one at the expense of the others would undermine the whole process. On
the other hand, the reconstruction of the Balkans can only make sense if it is directly linked to the
progressive integration of all countries in the region into the European system, leading eventually to
membership of the EU. And this should be coupled with ever closer co-operation at the regional level.
* * * * * * * * * *
1I. Introduction
The 1990s have witnessed the unfolding of a new process of Balkanisation, that is to say, a process of
seemingly endless conflict and ever smaller states and political units in this much troubled region of
Europe. In contrast to the dominant trends towards integration in Western and Central Europe, the
Balkans are characterised by fragmentation, war and economic decline. The process of Balkanisation
poses significant security risks to the international community – the violence that characterises the region
has a tendency to spread, through refugees, criminal networks, and through a nasty form of nationalism.
Above all, it deprives the citizens of the region of responsive and responsible political systems as well as
viable economic opportunities.
There is growing awareness that this process of Balkanisation will not in the end prove to be self-
stabilising and a growing consensus that the international community will have to take greater
responsibility for the region. In particular, there is a need to find ways to counter the process of
fragmentation through integrating the region as a whole into the rest of Europe. This is the thinking behind
the Stability Pact, announced at the European Council meeting in Cologne on June 10, 1999, and the
various proposals for some kind of ‘Marshall Plan’ for the region. It goes, of course, without saying that
stability, democracy and economic prosperity cannot simply be imported from outside. The international
community, and the EU in particular, can help by providing the framework, the incentives, pecuniary or
otherwise, as well as the technical advice needed. Still, the main responsibility for the stabilisation,
democratisation and economic development of the Balkans will continue to lie with the peoples of the
region.
The Stability Pact, undoubtedly, offers a way forward if the Balkan region is to break out of the cycle of
violence and disintegration. But it is also fraught with difficulties. In this paper, we investigate the
problems in different fields – security, politics and economics – and we try to develop an innovative
approach towards the region that is distinct from previous experiences both of post-war reconstruction
and of transition from communism.
The term ‘reconstruction’ tends to presuppose a decisive political settlement, as was the case after
World War II. In the Balkans, this has not yet happened. Borders and sovereignty continue to be
contested in several parts of the region. Indeed, the extreme nationalism that led to conflict in former
Yugoslavia is, at the same time, nurtured by conflict. This kind of nationalism can be described as a
social phenomenon involving an unhealthy alliance between nationalist leaders, various paramilitary and
criminal gangs as well as parts of the security services – an alliance that thrives on instability and periodic
violence. It could be described as a form of criminalisation in which laws and social norms are routinely
violated over a whole range of activities. War crimes, human rights violations, looting and pillaging are
2the extreme, albeit frequent, manifestations of this kind of criminalisation. But there is also widespread
corruption, clientelism, as well as petty theft, illegal trading, and black marketeering.
In this context, reconstruction has to be understood not only as physical and economic reconstruction
but also as social and institutional reconstruction. Indeed, the former is impossible without the latter. The
primary goal of reconstruction, we argue, is restoration of the rule of law. This applies in all fields. In the
case of security, it means that political agreement according to international principles has to supplant the
use of violence in solving conflicts and that legal instruments must replace military instruments. In the case
of politics, it means respect for human rights and for the establishment of a secure environment in which
individuals can freely participate in political life. And in the economic field, it means creating opportunities
for legitimate ways of earning a living, in particular, productive employment.
This understanding of reconstruction has implications for the way we think about transition.
Reconstruction cannot mean restoration of what existed previously; it must involve transition to
democracy and a market economy. However, as we argue, standard recipes for transition are
inappropriate unless accompanied by other measures. Thus, several studies of Balkan reconstruction
advocate trade liberalisation and even euroisation of the region (see, for example, CEPS, 1999). While
we agree with many of the measures advocated, we believe that they may lead to further economic
decline and criminalisation, unless accompanied by measures aimed at reforming the political and
economic laws and institutions and at stimulating the productive economy.
In this paper, we treat the region as a whole, although we place greater emphasis on the countries more
directly affected by the war in former Yugoslavia. We argue in favour of a regional approach to be
adopted by the international community and the EU in particular aiming at the progressive integration of
all the countries of the Balkans in the European system, of which the EU constitutes by far the most
important part. Integration in Europe should proceed in parallel with regional co-operation/integration,
the two processes being mutually reinforcing.
In the Balkans, there is always a problem with definitions: how people define themselves and how they
are defined by others. In this paper, we define the Balkans to include all the successor republics of
former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. To all intents and purposes, Slovenia has already
defined itself out of the region. It would, however, be advisable to include Slovenia in several projects of
regional co-operation; and the same could apply to Hungary. The Republic of Moldova could also be
added to the list, although this may involve a sensitive political decision concerning a country of the CIS.
Last but not least, Greece and Turkey are also part of the Balkans: the former having been a full member
of the EU since 1981, and the latter with a long and rather turbulent history of institutional relations with
the Union. The EU is therefore already present in the region. The regional approach advocated in this
3paper will concentrate on the former communist countries of the region, with the EU as an active
participant in the reconstruction of the Balkans, although the involvement of other countries of the wider
region and the international community at large will, of course, also be strongly desirable.
Multilateralism is not incompatible with the differential treatment of countries based on particular needs
and also on progress registered with respect to goals jointly defined. The aim should be to provide the
instruments and incentives for reconstruction and integration, but not to proceed at the speed of the
slowest. Thus, countries which are already considered eligible for accession to the EU - or even ready to
start accession negotiations - should have absolutely nothing to fear from a regional approach aiming at
reconstruction and integration for the region as a whole.
The regional approach advocated in this paper will, however, be very difficult without significant change
in Serbia. While the current regime in Serbia is not solely responsible for all the disasters of the last few
years, it is very difficult to envisage any form of what might be called debalkanisation, unless it includes
Serbia. Therefore, this paper pays special attention to the situation in FR Yugoslavia.
In this paper, we examine the impact of the Kosovo crisis, the main features of the Balkan political
economy and the lessons of transition, including the lessons of reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
This examination of the present situation in the Balkans is followed by our proposals for a new approach
towards the region, including external security, democratisation, as well as macro- and microeconomic
policy. The next section concentrates on European and regional integration. It is followed by
conclusions.
II. The Present Situation
II.1 The Impact of the Kosovo Crisis
Security Implications
The entry of NATO and other troops into Kosovo and the United Nations Security Council’s
authorising an international civil presence in Kosovo did not amount to a resolution of the conflict over
Kosovo. There remains considerable uncertainty not only about the future of Kosovo but about the
future of the whole region; several important issues continue to be contested and are, indeed, flash points
for further tension. Many of these issues were sparked by the crisis over Kosovo. They include:
4· The future of Kosovo itself. The UN Security Council resolution 1244, according to which KFOR
entered Kosovo, provides both for ‘substantial self-government’ of Kosovo and at the same time,
reaffirms  the  sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus
Kosovo’s future status remains unresolved. KFOR has been unable to prevent the flight of Serbs
and other minorities, especially Roma, from Kosovo; those few Serbs that remain are confined to
enclaves or divided cities like Mitrovica which could constitute a permanent source of tension.
KFOR has also been unable to prevent the influx of criminal gangs from Albania, who also
contribute to instability. In the medium and long-term, a peaceful resolution depends on whether the
UN administration and KFOR are able to provide conditions of ‘normality’ in which the energies of
the Kosovar population can be directed towards reconstruction and democratisation and respect for
minorities.
· The future of the Milosevic regime in Serbia. New forms of opposition have developed as a result of
the way Milosevic handled the war in Kosovo. These include the Orthodox Church which was
openly critical of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, reservists who have not yet received wartime pay, the
families of war victims, as well as Serbian refugees from Kosovo who are hidden from public view.
Despite pressure from the international community, the political opposition remains divided. There
are, at the time of writing, new proposals for a non-political government of experts which could
replace Milosevic and organise elections, and many individuals and groups appear to be mobilising in
support of this concept. The possibility of a civil war in Serbia, especially in Szandjak or Voividina,
or of new conflicts in neighbouring countries cannot be ruled out as long as Milosevic tries to defend
his political position using the instrument of instability, as he has done previously.
· The situation in Montenegro. Montenegrin society is polarised between those who support the
process of democratic reform and those who remain loyal to the Milosevic regime. This division
crosses most groups in society – political parties, the government, the security forces, and even
families. The war provided an opportunity for a comeback by the pro-Milosevic groups that had
been defeated in the elections. It also strengthened the conviction of many in the group favouring
democracy, whose voices are becoming increasingly louder, that Montenegro cannot long remain
hostage to the policies of Milosevic. At the end of August, the Montenegrin government put forward
a proposal for redefining the relationship with the government in Belgrade, including a separate
currency for Montenegro; so far, there has been no official reply. Tension currently centres around
the presence of the Yugoslav Army in Montenegro which has not been reduced in size since the end
of the conflict, and the proposal by the Belgrade government to establish a federal police force to
counter the Montenegrin police force which is loyal to Djukanovic. Thus, developments in
Montenegro, and the future of FR Yugoslavia, are very much linked to the process of
democratisation in Serbia.
5· The fragility of FYR Macedonia. Both the swelling of the Albanian population as a result of the huge
influx of refugees, and the opposition to NATO bombing by the Slav population has been highly
destabilising. The tension has been eased by the return of refugees to Kosovo, nevertheless the
viability of the state remains in question.
· Continued tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO actions were strongly opposed by the Serbian
population. Some Serbian nationalists referred to the bombing as ‘criminal aggression’ and even
hinted at the possibility of military action against NATO forces in Republika Srpska. The influx of
refugees (Serbian draft dodgers and Muslims from Sandzjak), the cutting of economic links with FR
Yugoslavia, and the recruitment of paramilitary forces to fight in Kosovo, all contributed to increased
polarisation between those who favour the eventual partition of Bosnia and those, including the
Prime Minister Dodik, who see the future of Republika Srpska as dependent on closer ties with the
Federation.
· The absence of rule of law in Albania. Ever since the crisis of 1997, the Albanian state has been
fragmented and unable to control the lawlessness of Albanian society and the widespread presence
of organised gangs, especially in the Northern stronghold of former President Berisha.
Moreover, these contested issues have to be situated, in a set of social conditions typical of ‘new war
economies’ which have been accentuated during the Kosovo crisis (Kaldor, 1999). The factors that
generate a vested interest in violence include: high unemployment and high levels of criminality; extremist
politicians whose power depends on an atmosphere of crisis; clan-based familial arrangements with long
traditions of so-called heroic acts to be emulated and humiliations and tragedies to be avenged; the
availability of surplus arms as a result of the failure to control arms caches built up during the Cold War
period and the flourishing black market; and the existence of independent or private militias or
paramilitary groups.
Furthermore, these social conditions cannot be contained geographically. The factors which are
conducive to violence spread across borders via the black market and arms trade, through sanction
busting, through refugees and minority groups, as well as through paramilitary and criminal networks.
Thus local issues interact with broader tensions in the region as a whole, for example, between Greece
and Turkey, and also broader international tensions between East and West.
Effects of the war on Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro
A number of estimates of the economic costs of the war in Kosovo, in Serbia and in Montenegro exist,
but these are, as a rule, incomplete and the figures vary widely. For instance, the current official
6Yugoslav projection for the decline of GDP this year is around 25% (it is not clear whether this includes
Kosovo). Previously, official estimates put the decline at around 40%. Similar estimates of around 40%
have been endorsed by the Group 17 in Belgrade and by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The Belgrade-
based Institute of Economic Sciences has put the expected decline at around 35%. The same goes for
all other estimates of current economic activities.
The estimates of physical damage vary considerably too. This is due to the lack of information available
and also for methodological reasons, that is to say in considering what is and what is not to be included
as ‘damages’. The World Bank has commissioned a study to determine the (physical) damages in
Kosovo and the outcome is an estimate of about USD 1.2 bn. Estimates of the costs of similar damages
in the rest of Yugoslavia vary from less than USD 1 bn (Group 17) to USD 3-4 bn from a number of
international observers to USD 30 bn from official sources.
The estimates of costs in the wider sense of lost wealth, lost GDP and losses that are the consequence of
opportunity costs vary widely too. The early estimate by the Group 17 has the sum total of costs and
losses at around USD 30 bn. The Economist Intelligence Unit has come up with the figure of around
USD 60 bn. Some EU and World Bank officials have mentioned the figure of USD (or Euro) 30 bn, but
these refer to reconstruction costs and not to damages and losses as such. Obviously, these figures are
quite speculative and it is not really clear what they are supposed to mean1. Moreover, estimates of the
costs of the war do not seem to bear much relation to estimates of the requirements for reconstruction.
The first donor conference on Kosovo held at the end of July 1999 estimated about two billion US
dollars in pledges for reconstruction costs.
It is perhaps more useful to try to describe the current economic situation in qualitative rather than
quantitative terms, relying on little more than anecdotal evidence. Available reports on Kosovo indicate
that agricultural activity has resumed throughout a large part of the province. The same goes for trade
and some services. However, whatever industrial production there once was has not seen a revival. The
reasons for this stagnation appear to be the following:
                                                
1 Some of the calculations of the losses amount to the determination of the opportunity cost of the conflict in
Kosovo. Mostly, the loss of GDP over the one that would have been achieved is taken to stand for the
opportunity cost of the conflict. This definition of the opportunity cost is incomplete because for the opportunity
cost to be well-defined the full set of alternatives should be considered. For instance, one way to calculate the
opportunity cost of the conflict in Kosovo is to calculate the long-term growth rate before and after the conflict,
e.g., on the basis of the one or the other version of the classical or new growth theory. Then, the difference
between the two streams of GDP that they generate would be the opportunity cost of the conflict in Kosovo. In
that case, however, it could be argued that the growth rate before and after the conflict should be the same, in
which case the cost would be infinite. So, and this is the point being made here, this way of calculating the
opportunity cost is not very enlightening.
7First, some of the industry has been damaged and its reconstruction is not a matter of first priority.
Second, there are serious problems with the determination of ownership. More generally, the entire legal
structure is non-existent, which makes the rehabilitation of industrial production difficult. Third, there are
problems with management: in many cases the managers of the firms were Serbs who have either fled or
have been dismissed in one way or another, so it is not clear who is to run the companies in Kosovo.
Fourth, the traditional markets have become inaccessible: Kosovo was formerly integrated into the
economy of Serbia and Yugoslavia; new markets are yet to be found and this will take time2.
However, the most serious problem is the lack of a political, legal and administrative infrastructure. Laws
are yet to be written, and their enactment will have to wait for the creation of a political structure. Even
when this is done, there will be the problem of implementation. It will take at least a year for some kind
of order to be established.
Moving from Kosovo to Montenegro, the current economic situation there is much easier to describe,
though again, little more than anecdotal evidence can be relied on. The damages of the NATO bombing
campaign to the physical assets of Montenegro have been comparably small. Losses in GDP have been
significant however, especially in trade and services, e.g., in tourism. However, Montenegro has
received some financial help from the EU and the USA and has thus been able to lessen the pain of
economic hardship on the population. Thus, pensions and wages are almost twice as high in Montenegro
than in Serbia and are paid more regularly; there are no shortages of gasoline or of other goods; and
finally, economic activities are conducted much more freely since Montenegro never introduced the laws
of war economy that were introduced in Serbia.
Unlike Montenegro, the economic situation in Serbia is almost dramatic. During the conflict in Kosovo
and for a few months after it ended, prices were kept under control so that inflation in the first half of the
year was around 15%. In August, some prices were liberalised and some were corrected (e.g., the price
of gasoline). The government is having difficulty meeting its obligations, especially to the army and
pensioners, and has therefore been printing money, though not in an uncontrolled manner. Nevertheless,
with the GDP shrinking, the increased money supply has led to the depreciation of the Yugoslav dinar
which has increased pressure on prices. So, inflation has been picking up strongly in September and
October amounting to more than 10% per month.
The Serbian government faces a difficult task in the coming months. It must find a way do as much as
possible in order to restart at least some industrial activity. It must also find a way to ration goods such
as gasoline, electricity, and heating. And finally, it must find sources for budget revenues. Since foreign
                                                
2 Some data on the economy of Kosovo can be found in Mustafa, 1998. See also Mustafa, 1999.
8finances are unavailable and the domestic financial system bankrupt, this will be a tough act to perform.
Its immediate goal is to survive through the coming winter.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the people in Serbia are indeed preparing for an adjustment to a
significantly lower level of welfare. The government is planning to ration electricity and heating, so the
majority of the population is planning to use coal and even wood to cook food and to heat apartments.
The tariffs on goods such as second-hand cars, cigarettes and a number of other items that used to be
smuggled, have been lowered. This indicates that, for the time being, the government has given up on the
domestic production of these goods. More generally, except for some emergency repairs of the
infrastructure, no significant economic reconstruction is possible. Thus, the emphasis is on the supply of
food for the winter and on electricity, i.e., on survival. No significant revival in production and
employment is planned or expected.
Slightly more structured anecdotal evidence suggests that the price level in Serbia fell significantly during
the war. Given that inflation was subdued while the Yugoslav dinar continued to depreciate, prices were
very low if calculated in German marks. Even the price of imported goods was often lower than abroad,
indicating that many of the goods had been imported some time ago and their price had not been fully
adjusted because of the low purchasing power of the population. In general, the price level in Belgrade
for the most commonly used items found in the stores was roughly about a third of that in Austria for
instance. If the price of services is included, the price level can be halved again. So, a rough estimate
could put the price level in Belgrade at one-fifth or one-sixth of that in Austria. Prices in the countryside
are of course even lower. This is not surprising since the average wage in Serbia has fallen to about DM
80 and is expected to fall further. The current acceleration of inflation may not reverse this significantly,
because the depreciation of the dinar is speeding up too.
With incomes low and foreign finances unavailable, imports have decreased significantly. The official
expectation is that imports will contract by almost 60% this year while exports will fall by about 50%
(Yugoslav Survey, 1999). The trade deficit is expected to be more than halved (compared with 1998).
This deficit will not be much smaller as a share of GDP because the latter is also expected to be almost
halved this year. Therefore, the external equilibrium will be very difficult to sustain. The fall in imports as
well as in exports will make it all but impossible for economic activity to recover any time soon.
All in all, the current economic situation in Serbia is grave. Work and business are scarce, money is in
short supply, and reconstruction and recovery cannot be expected within the existing economic and
political framework. The government is promising that it will work miracles, but the population is
readying itself for a protracted period of hardship.
9Regional Economic Consequences
The Kosovo crisis has had a significant economic impact on neighbouring countries and on the region as
a whole. This has manifested itself principally in three ways: (i) costs of refugees and other costs directly
connected with the war, (ii) losses in income and output due to falls in foreign trade, consumption and
investment, and (iii) stability and development costs.
Initially, there were expectations that refugees would pose a long-term problem. However, it turned out
that the repatriation process was swifter than anticipated, therefore the consequences for the countries in
the region may prove to be negligible; although the problem of emigration from the whole region is a
long-term and important one. Indeed, if the situation in Serbia continues to deteriorate, significant
pressure on emigration to neighbouring countries and beyond may be expected. This, of course, would
reach a level of crisis were civil war to erupt in Serbia, a possibility not to be dismissed altogether. In the
case of both situations developing simultaneously (i.e. lack of positive political change and civil war), the
consequences for the region in terms of the large movements of population may be quite significant.
Other important and enduring consequences are those associated with the worsening conditions for
production, trade and investment. Trade in goods and services (e.g., tourism) have been affected
significantly and these effects may, in some cases, be felt for quite some time due to the slow recovery of
the Serbian market and the higher transportation costs through Serbia (both via land routes and via the
Danube). Although data for the first half of 1999 is still not available for all countries, the preliminary
assessment points to the widening of trade deficits of goods and services in Bulgaria, Croatia and
Bosnia- Herzegovina. On the other hand, the merchandise trade deficit in FR Yugoslavia and FYR
Macedonia is smaller because of the larger falls in imports than in exports. Trade and current account
deficits of Hungary are increasing, but this is only marginally influenced by the Kosovo crisis. The
development of Romanian external balances is ambiguous and also minimally affected by the Kosovo
crisis.
With the worsening of economic circumstances, consumption, both private and public, has been
adversely affected in a number of countries. The budget deficit in FYR Macedonia has deteriorated
dramatically. The deficits in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina were already significant before the Kosovo
crisis. The central government budget in Croatia is also under severe pressure, though the influence of
the Kosovo crisis in this particular case is not decisive. The fiscal situation in Bulgaria is sure to
deteriorate because of poor growth performance, to which the Kosovo crisis contributed. Other
countries in the region have fiscal problems that are largely unconnected to the Kosovo crisis.
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Finally, investment, especially foreign investment, has become even more scarce, which has aggravated
the business conditions in the region. Again, data is hard to come by, but it is certain that more or less
everything regarding foreign investments in the Western Balkans is on hold. In Bulgaria and Romania the
situation is somewhat ambiguous since it is not yet clear whether some of the foreign investment planned
will be realised before the end of the year.
The most enduring consequences may be those connected with the overall macroeconomic stability and
with the speed of the reforms necessary for the region to move towards sustained growth. All of the
countries in the region (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia, FYR Macedonia, Albania,
Bulgaria and Romania) have weak macroeconomic and even weaker microeconomic indicators. On the
macroeconomic side, they run large trade and current account deficits (Bulgaria was an exception until
this year), large or significant budget deficits and have high or catastrophic levels of unemployment. On
the microeconomic side, they have weak or collapsing financial sectors, weak and bankrupt enterprise
sectors and weak and corrupt public and private governance. Thus, most of the countries in the region
are either coming out of a crisis, are in crisis or are falling into one. All of these problems tend to become
aggravated, if growth disappoints or turns negative. According to various estimates, the marginal
contribution of Kosovo in that respect (i.e., shortfall of GDP growth in 1999) ranges from 5% for F.Y.R
Macedonia to 3% for Bosnia-Herzegovina (mainly in Republika Srpska), to 2% for Bulgaria and
Albania, to 1% for Croatia and to 0.5% for Romania (and possibly also for Hungary). But the
contribution to negative prospects for sustained growth may be much more important and enduring.
II.2 Main Features of the Political Economy of the Balkan region
Political and Security Characteristics
There are two major security problems in the Balkan region – no clear borders and the absence of the
rule of law. The responsibilities of the central governments and other political entities are often conflicting
because conflicting territorial jurisdictions remain. This is the case both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in
Kosovo, but it will increasingly be the case in Montenegro and in Serbia, as well as in Albania and
possibly FYR Macedonia. Indeed, large parts of the so-called Western Balkans3 consist of states
without clear borders. The efforts to secure borders around ethnically homogeneous territories through
the techniques of population displacement and ‘ethnic cleansing’, have generated large numbers of
refugees and displaced persons and laid the basis for long-term tensions in the region.
                                                
3  As defined by the EU, the Western Balkans include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FR Yugoslavia and FYR
Macedonia.
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Conflicting territorial jurisdiction is compounded by the weak or non-existent rule of law, both
domestically and between states. Externally, there are no accepted mechanisms for the peaceful
resolution of border disputes. Domestically, law enforcement and the judicial system (i.e. police and law
courts), do not function effectively, if at all. Indeed, with the collapse of local political structures, the legal
vacuum that has emerged has led to a certain degree of lawlessness throughout the whole region.
These security problems cannot be disentangled from the undemocratic character of regimes in the
region. The rule of law is not just a matter of formal arrangements. Paper constitutions and democratic
rules are important. But they have to be based on and upheld by norms and values that are widely
accepted in society. In the former Yugoslav states, many of the elements of formal democracy and the
rule of law do exist. Elections are held with competing candidates and virtually universal suffrage; there
are paper commitments to European standards of human rights, free media, freedom of association, and
rules for a market economy. There are, of course, some serious shortcomings in the formal
arrangements, most notably the ethnic basis of constitutions. But the fundamental problem is the
existence of ruling groups who fail to respect the underlying norms and values and who espouse
exclusivist, nationalist politics.
Most important in this respect is the Milosevic regime in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia.
It is true, as many people in Belgrade insist, that it is not only the Milosevic regime that is responsible for
all the tragedies of the last few years. The Tudjman government in Croatia, the nationalists in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the KLA in Kosovo have also contributed to the unfolding of these terrible events. It is
also true that the removal of Milosevic will not instantly lead to democratisation and respect for the rule
of law. Milosevic is at the apex of a system of violence and political extremism that has entrenched itself
in the Western Balkans through the mechanism of war. Nevertheless, a change of regime would unblock
the process of democratisation. It would make possible policies and measures designed to strengthen the
lawful and democratic elements in society, and it would have a knock-on effect on the neighbouring
countries.
Throughout the region, nationalist parties came to power and have stayed in power through elections
that, at least on paper, were democratic. Nevertheless, these elections took place within the framework
of societies that had experienced what has been described as ‘soft totalitarianism’. Although the former
Yugoslavia was much more liberal than the communist regimes in the rest of Eastern Europe, the ruling
party exercised control over most key aspects of everyday life – sources of livelihood, security, and
propaganda. As in other Eastern European countries, there was no clear distinction between politics and
economics. Many of these forms of control were inherited and adapted by the present regimes.
Milosevic rules through networks of loyal people in the security services, in key economic positions, or
in the electronic media, who are also connected to various paramilitary and criminal groups. His control
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is less absolute than the former communist regimes and, indeed, this may explain the need for violence
and instability. But his position is strengthened by an authoritarian tradition that tends to support whoever
is in power, by weak civil society especially outside major towns, by material and physical insecurity,
and by a shared sense of being a victim rather than an accomplice in the disintegrative processes of the
last few years. The system of rule is similar in other parts of former Yugoslavia, especially Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina and indeed undemocratic elements of this kind exist in all the post-communist
Balkan societies.
There are, of course, alternative forces in society – individuals and groups who favour democratic
reform. These are centred around independent media (mainly print and radio), NGOs and universities.
These groups are greatly weakened and marginalised in conditions of war. Many educated people who
form the backbone of these groups have left the region over the last few years. The Milosevic regime has
introduced a number of measures to control NGOs and universities. Nevertheless, these groups may
have more tacit support than is often assumed. The victory of opposition parties in Serbia in 1997 and
the refusal of the regime to allow the newly elected parties to take power led to sustained
demonstrations all over Serbia and the eventual capitulation of the government. Likewise, the election of
a coalition of opposition parties, led by Djukanovic in Montenegro, has initiated a process of democratic
reform in Montenegro. Similar positive developments in other parts of former Yugoslavia, include the
sidelining of extreme Serbian nationalists in Republika Srpska and growing support for the Social
Democrats in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the likelihood of a change of regime in Croatia
after the next elections.
Elsewhere in the region, pro-democracy forces are much stronger. Bulgaria and Romania have managed
to sustain the process of democratisation, despite great economic difficulties, and have also registered
significant progress in the treatment of their own ethnic minorities, which may serve as an example for the
other countries in the region. A fragile coalition of Slav Macedonian and Albanian nationalist parties in
F.Y.R Macedonia has survived, for the time being, the after shock of the Kosovo crisis. On the other
hand, in Albania the rule of law hardly exists and state power is extremely weak.
Macroeconomic Characteristics
The political characteristics of the region have profound implications for the management of economies.
There are serious problems with public governance in all the Balkan countries. These have to do with the
lack of responsibility, responsiveness, transparency and, going beyond internal politics, with the lack of
regional and international co-ordination. These are all vital for a country or a group of countries that face
major institutional and political reforms and changes and they are reflected in disequilibria of various
types and in economic instability.
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The region, whether South-East Europe is considered or just the Balkans, is economically quite diverse.
If only post-communist countries are considered, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita ranges
from 500 euros in some areas of Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina to over 4500 euros in
Croatia. If other Balkan and South-East European countries are added, the diversity increases. Thus
generalisations should be attempted with caution. This is worth saying at the very beginning, because
what follows will treat the similarities in the macroeconomic characteristics of most of the transition
countries in the Balkans.
The similarities have to do with the persistence of macroeconomic disequilibria and with the instability of
the process of transition, growth and development. Three macroeconomic disequilibria are most
important:
1) External disequilibrium. All transition countries in the Balkans run significant, large or very
large trade and current account deficits which are basically unsustainable (see also Table 1,
Annex I). It is important to treat the issue of sustainability in more detail. In the longer run,
the initial trade and current account deficits can be sustained if they are eventually going to be
financed from increases in exports of goods and services. Otherwise, either imports will fuel
consumption or production for import-substitution and the deficits will accumulate beyond
the levels of sustainability. So, the external deficits by themselves are not an indication of a
problem, however if they are not instruments of growth and development they will breed
instability and crisis. In the Balkans, the transition economies seem to be running these kinds
of unsustainable external deficits and have already gone through one or more exchange rate
or banking crises or both.
 
2) Internal disequilibrium. All transition economies in the Balkans have significant, high or
very high unemployment rates (Table 1). These range from about 10% in Romania to about
40% in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Employment is decreasing and unemployment is increasing
practically everywhere. This is a consequence of the process of de-industrialisation that has
been going on in the entire region. Again, there are significant differences between countries
like Albania, where industry is almost non-existent, and countries like Romania or Croatia
where industrial production has been downsized, but is still present. More important is the
fact that the process of the closing down of industrial firms and enterprises in the region leads
to an increase in employment in the shadow economy and even in agriculture. The
contribution of agriculture to the GDP of almost every country in the region has increased
(because agricultural production has shrunk less than both GDP as a whole and industrial
production) and in a number of cases so has employment. Thus, the region is, from an
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economic point of view, a backward one that faces the task of embarking on the path of
industrialisation.
 
3) Fiscal disequilibrium. Most of the transition economies in the Balkans run significant and
often unsustainable fiscal deficits. In some cases, fiscal deficits do not appear to be an
immediate problem, but this is often misleading. In fact, in most countries even those public
obligations that are honoured would not be honoured if aid of some sort or were not
forthcoming. The quality and the stability of public finances is an even more serious matter.
Most social services are collapsing and significant public obligations towards certain
segments of society are continuously being defaulted on. There are any number of problems
with the efficiency and equity of public finances in the region, though the most fundamental is
that the states in the region are practically bankrupt.
Macroeconomic disequilibria have contributed significantly to the lack of growth in the Balkans. All
former communist countries in the region are still far behind GDP levels registered in 1989 (Table 1).
Most of the countries in transition in the Balkans have gone through one or more episodes of instability
or crisis. For instance, all of the successor states of former Yugoslavia have experienced an episode of
hyper-inflation or of very high inflation. Most of the other countries in the region have also struggled with
inflation and faced the spectre of hyper-inflation. However, even after prices stabilise, growth is either
slow or often turns negative. At the moment, most of the region has a negative growth rate (exceptions
are Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina).
The reasons for this instability are to be found in the macroeconomic disequilibria described above, that
have to be periodically corrected through crises, and external shocks that are hard to absorb. Obviously,
macroeconomic stability, domestic and regional, would be helpful, but would not necessarily deliver
sustainable growth and development. Reforms and changes would be necessary too. Here, there is a
circulus vitiosus: the instability of growth influences negatively the sustainability of the political will to
reform, while the lack of reforms undermines the economic growth. It is sometimes suggested that the
circle can be broken after a major crisis, but this is not necessarily true in cases in which the economic
prospects of a country depend significantly on regional stability; in which case a regional approach to
stability and growth is required. This has proven difficult to forge in the Balkans, at least so far.
Microeconomic Characteristics
Growth is as much a microeconomic phenomenon as it is a macroeconomic one. Current
microeconomic characteristics of the region have to do with structural changes, the financial system and
the quality of institutions.
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1) De-industrialisation. Throughout the region the share of industrial production of total GDP has
decreased and there has been an increase in the contribution of agriculture and services. Even these
two sectors have gone through significant structural changes and adjustments which have to do with
what can be also seen as a version of de-industrialisation, i.e., those types of agricultural production
and services that are not dependent on industry or do not contribute all that much to industrial
production have grown faster. In addition, de-industrialisation in the Balkans does not seem to be a
transitory phenomenon. In many cases in which a recovery has occurred, that of industrial
production has been less convincing and often unsustainable. Indeed, it is to be expected that the
process of de-industrialisation will continue for some time and may in fact accelerate.
 
2) Financial situation. The banking sector throughout the region is in bad shape. The reasons for this
are not the same in all of the countries concerned. For instance, in some of the countries of former
Yugoslavia, the credibility of banks is low because they are in default on foreign currency savings. In
other countries, the more familiar problem of accumulated bad loans is greater. In other cases still,
there is the problem of moral hazard connected with the history of the rehabilitation programmes of
banks by which the budget takes on the losses of the banking system. What goes for the banking
sector also goes for the other financial institutions. Thus, the entire financial system needs to be
restructured.
 
3) Privatisation. In the region as a whole, either privatisation is lagging or the privatisation
programmes chosen have been more than usually inefficient and unjust. As a consequence,
enterprises lack clear ownership structure which has negative consequences for corporate
governance. The central problem is how to restructure enterprises and depoliticise the management
of enterprises so as to take economic positions out of the control of politicians.
 
4) Institutional problems. Throughout the region the key economic institutions do not function
properly. Private property is not protected, the rule of law is not strong, corruption is rife, shadow
economy is significant. However, generalisations here are more dangerous than in other instances.
Obviously the situation in Bulgaria, for example, is not the same as that in Albania. Still, general
characterisation is useful in order to point to the fact that the institutional circumstances are such that
it is not surprising that private governance is not well organised and efficient throughout the region.
This has significant consequences for the way entrepreneurial and managerial skills are allocated and
used.
Given the microeconomic circumstances, as described above, it is not surprising that the allocation of
resources in the Balkans is not optimal and that greater effort is being put into the redistribution of
resources than in their production. As a consequence, growth is disappointing. In addition, the process
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of restructuring incited by this microeconomic set-up may lock the region onto a path of development
which may be difficult to reverse.
Private Governance
Like public governance, private governance is deficient in a number of ways. Unlike during communism,
current problems do not originate from ‘soft-budget’ constraints. Rather, they are caused by a number
of institutional failures, some commonly present in ‘emerging markets’, some developmental. They could
be called ‘soft-legal’ constraints. Some of these will be mentioned here:
1) Soft contracts. Probably the key deficiency of private governance is connected with the importance
of contractual relations. Essentially, contracts are considered to be unilaterally renegotiable. From
the theoretical point of view, such contracts are optimal only if there are no missing markets, now or
in the future. In which case, of course, contracts would be self-enforcing (which is probably a
contradictio in adjecto). In normal, not to mention emerging, market economies, this is not the
case. Thus, the wide-spread practice of unilateral re-negotiation of contracts represents, in effect,
the culture of default.
 
2) Inverted principles and agents. Due to the prevailing models of privatisation implemented in the
region, unclear or perverted relations between principles and agents have emerged. This is mostly
visible in cases in which management buy-outs play a significant role. In these cases, the managerial
functions are not substituted with the owner’s function. In other words, rather than maximising the
value of the firm, new owners tend to maximise managerial returns. The latter can be achieved, in the
short-term, at the expense of the former.
 
3) Distorted competition. Markets in the region are distorted in more ways than one. Without going
into details, it is fair to say that markets are segmented, monopolised, plagued with discriminatory
rules and, in any case, do not conform to even an approximation of the ‘free entry and exit’ criterion.
This is the consequence of the unconvincing liberalisation and of the less than fair methods of
privatisation that have been introduced.
 
4) Lack of insurance. One characteristic of the emerging economy in the region is, paradoxically, the
lack of moral hazard. As institutions are weak and public governance deficient, institutions geared
towards making business activities more secure and predictable are absent. Thus, the problem
opposite to the one that characterises moral hazard (also present especially when it comes to the
way the banking system operates) is quite pervasive. Rather than operating as if the risks are too
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low, the entrepreneurs have to operate as if the risks are too high. This lowers overall business
activity.
Lessons of Transition
Any large scale aid programme has to take account of the lessons of transition over the last ten years,
especially in Southeastern Europe. Transition was originally conceived in terms of a set of more or less
standard recipes. In the political field, the emphasis was on the formal aspects of democracy, in
particular, the introduction of elections. In the economic field, the emphasis was on liberalisation,
stabilisation and privatisation.
What we have learned from the experience of post-Soviet and Balkan countries is that the political
process of transition can be risky and turbulent. Elections that are held before the other prerequisites of
democracy such as free media, active civil society and, above all a functioning rule of law are
established, even if conducted relatively fairly, can contribute to instability, by providing a mechanism for
legitimising extremist politicians. In Central Europe, many of these prerequisites do exist although the rule
of law and civil society is weak in several countries. In those countries where a degree of pluralism
preceded transition, for example Poland, Hungary or Slovenia, a democratic political culture is beginning
to develop.  Despite the decentralisation of the former Yugoslavia, a variety of factors including the
authoritarian tradition in rural areas, the vacuum of political power at the federal level, the weakness of
civil society and a widespread sense of insecurity arising both from unemployment and weak rule of law,
led to the victory of extreme nationalists in the first democratic elections, who were able to hijack the
political process.
In the economic field, transition has been successful in dismantling and, in some cases, depoliticising the
inefficient state sector. And it has also provided the opportunity for the emergence of a more dynamic
private sector. But inevitably, everywhere, the consequence of transition strategies has been a degree of
de-industrialisation. In only a few countries, for example Poland and Slovenia, has the new private sector
been able to generate sufficient productive opportunities to offset the decline of the state sector. In the
vast majority of transition countries, national income is much lower than it was in 1989 and, nearly
everywhere, unemployment is high.
The performance of the countries in the Balkans in the last ten years has been worse than in Central
Europe and even the Baltic countries. The latter regions have superior macroeconomic and
microeconomic characteristics and have grown faster, though the sustainability of their growth may still
be an open question, at least for some of them. What have the more successful countries done well and
what have the countries in the Balkans done wrong?
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Some of the differences have to do with the lack of public consensus around the goals of transition in
comparison with countries like Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. Also, there was
greater reluctance in the Balkan countries to break with the redistributive policies of the past. But
probably the most important difference is, of course, the one that is the consequence of the security
problems in the Balkans. The wars and the disintegration of Yugoslavia resulted not just in physical costs
but losses of trade, the diversion of transport and consequent increase in transport costs, the spread of
criminality associated with for example sanctions-busting or gunrunning, and the burden of refugees. In
addition, there are security problems that originate with the collapse of the internal political order, as in
the case of Albania in 1997.
These key differences led to delays in the introduction of the necessary changes as well as to reversals in
policy decisions. Thus, transition in countries like Croatia and FYR Macedonia was postponed till late
1993 or early 1994 when they introduced their programmes for stabilisation. Bosnia-Herzegovina
started to change only much later and still faces major problems and dilemmas, while in FR Yugoslavia
there was a deliberate attempt to avoid the process of transformation. Similarly, though for different
reasons, the transition in Bulgaria and Romania was delayed and in some sense is only just starting in
earnest. Finally, the process of transition in Albania collapsed in 1997 and is still to pick up speed.
Indeed, if the process of transition in the Balkans were to be evaluated in terms of the key areas of
reform, it could be seen that:
· stabilisation has been the most easy to attain, though its sustainability is another matter
· liberalisation has been incomplete or very deficient. Indeed, the Balkans is the one region
where the overall level of barriers to trade has increased significantly for one reason or
another
· privatisation has been lagging and has been marred with a larger than usual lack of
transparency, efficiency, and justice
· restructuring has mainly been passive, while active restructuring is sporadic or non-existent.
As a consequence of the key fundamental differences and of the delayed transition just described, the
social and political fabrics of these societies have suffered considerably. As is commonly observed, the
social capital in the Balkans is lower than in the more successful transition economies. Also, the level of
legality, legitimacy and credibility are lower. From this, another important lesson of transition can be
learned: corporate governance can hardly function properly without the proper functioning of
public governance. Put differently, market institutions can hardly deliver efficiency if the political and
legal institutions are distorted and dysfunctional.
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Thus, restructuring state capacity needs to be central in the effort to transform the economic system of
ex-socialist countries. The phenomenon of ‘weak states’ was among the principal causes of the collapse
of these economies. Transition, with its emphasis on downsizing the government, has actually weakened
the state – a ‘minimal’ state was sometimes confused with a ‘weak’ state. Socio-economic progress
along market lines is only possible if there is an effective state capable of fulfilling its basic functions (The
World Bank, 1997).
The Example of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Some of the lessons of transition discussed above were taken into account in the reconstruction effort
that began in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton agreement. The World Bank, as the lead agency, did
put an emphasis on institutional reform and institution building, although with some delay, and despite the
very great difficulties of operating in the contested territory. Rebuilding economic management structures
in line with the new constitutional arrangement for Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the main tasks of the
Priority Reconstruction Programme. Fiscal restructuring, aimed at restoring revenue raising capacity at all
levels of government - central state, entities, cantons and municipalities - has been the centrepiece of the
reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The World Bank has sponsored a fundamental tax reform and the reform
of the customs system. However, the implementation of the reform has been very slow due to the
obstructions by the local partners as well as the lack of administrative capacity in the relevant bodies. At
the same time, the reforms, which would restructure and reduce public spending as well as improve
expenditure management, have hardly begun.
Public spending is dominated by donor-funded reconstruction of physical assets, while locally raised
revenues cover social sector recurrent expenditure and defence spending. Thus, the issue of fiscal
sustainability, once donor assistance subsides, remains high on the agenda. There is a danger that a
significant imbalance between revenue and expenditure might emerge, especially in the Federation where
the progress in unifying the two still distinct economic systems inherited from the war leaves much to be
desired. The public sector in the post-war economy is almost by definition bound to be large, given
various claims for the restoration of basic services, while revenue collection capacity tends to lag behind.
Furthermore, the new constitutional set-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina has installed multiple layers of
government, which has resulted in the bloated, inefficient and often corrupt state apparatus, which poses
too heavy a burden on the country’s weak economy.
The Central Bank, which opened in August 1997, under the chairmanship of a foreign official, has strictly
adhered to the rules of the currency board, which has brought inflation down. But contrary to
expectations, currency stability, and hence increased confidence, have not translated into lower interest
rates (they are prohibitively high as finance is scarce, and financial institutions remain fragile, in spite of
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improved banking supervision and technical assistance provided under the various donor funded
schemes). High interest rates pose a strong constraint to the cash starved enterprise sector and
economic revival remains subdued.
The internationally financed reconstruction programme has resulted in a strong surge in imports, which
against the country’s modest export capacity, has created the large trade deficit (import to export ratio
was around 1:10 in mid 1999). It is estimated that some 90% of items for daily household consumption
are imported. Exports are concentrated in few sectors, while three markets, i.e. Croatia, Slovenia and
FR Yugoslavia account for around 50% of exports from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fragile economic
recovery and slow progress in economic reform suggest that the trade deficit is likely to remain large,
and will continue to cause a large current account deficit. Weak external position could eventually
undermine the currency board arrangement, which has so far been the mainstay of macroeconomic
stability, and sap economic growth.
Bosnia-Herzegovina has inherited significant foreign debt from the former Yugoslavia. Although financial
assistance in the framework of the post-war reconstruction has allowed the debt burden to increase only
modestly, there is genuine concern over the country’s debt-servicing capacity in the medium-term.
Bosnia-Herzegovina has been given a substantial debt write-off – 85.5% by the London Club and 65%
by the Paris Club of creditors. Even so, debt-servicing obligations were an issue in the formulation of the
state budget in 1997 and 1998. This was so partly because of inability of the entities to come up with the
funds needed, but also due to the constitutional arrangement whereby the central state is responsible for
servicing the foreign debt incurred by the entities, which are in turn required to transfer their respective
shares towards servicing the debt to the central budget. Servicing foreign debt is likely to remain
problematic in the absence of a more substantial inflow of foreign direct investment.
Some other specific elements have been included in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s reconstruction programme.
The World Bank has initiated the creation of an investment guarantee scheme, which offers prospective
investors the protection against the political risk of investment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a similar
scheme exists under the auspices of the European Union. In spite of this incentive, foreign investment has
been minimal, as Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to be perceived as high risk country with cumbersome
and costly administrative, legal and fiscal constraints, which act as further deterrent to potential foreign
investors. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s market is too small to be particularly attractive to foreign investors
anyway, and instability in the wider region has aggravated prospects of substantial foreign investment. An
export promotion scheme is also being considered, aimed at reinvigorating foreign sales; but exportable
items in the war ravaged economy are very few, and trade opportunities are restricted in the absence of
a wider co-operation between the two entities.
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Much of the initial strong post-war recovery has been reconstruction-led, while a widespread recovery
of production, particularly in industry, which was the backbone of the pre-war economy both in terms of
employment and output, has failed to materialise. Donor aid accounts for some 30% of official GDP; the
capacity utilisation is estimated at 40% of the pre-war level and industrial output at around 25%.
Unemployment in the country as a whole is around 40%, and in some areas exceeds 70%. One of the
main reasons for the lack of widespread recovery has to do with the fact that restructuring of the existing
production capacity has been much downplayed in the context of reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Transitional theory suggests that short-term growth effects should come from the improved allocation of
resources and better use of under-utilised capacities. In the context of an economy whose productive
capacity is to a great extent physically destroyed or technically obsolete, with broken supply networks,
lost markets and inadequate skills, and where the institutional framework is inadequate, it is difficult to
see how this process can be triggered without a systematic approach. Politics continues to take primacy
over economic considerations, which additionally complicates the potential for restarting some viable
production capacity. These enterprises are in the meantime subjected to further deterioration and erosion
of skills with serious implications on employment levels and balance of payment.
The experience of transition in other ex-communist countries confirms the leading role of the new private
enterprise sector in economic recovery. But in the post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, where early and
strong economic recovery, and job creation in particular, are of paramount importance in securing stable
peace, the emerging private sector, typically small and micro-service enterprises, cannot accomplish this
task. The internationally sponsored reconstruction programme has been built around a vision of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a service based economy. Compared with the inherited economic base, this implies a
wholesale structural change, requiring huge financial and human resources and a fairly long time horizon.
Given that one of the main reasons of prolonged economic decline prior to the war was precisely the
inability of the economy to adjust to changes related to the emergence of new technologies, a
developmental task on the scale that such a structural change would require is simply not possible in the
specific context of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Transition in this context requires a much more creative approach to these issues, especially since the
experience of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe suggests that the pace and sustainability of
the economic recovery continues to be largely dependent on the recovery of manufacturing (Boone,
Gomulka and Layard, 1998). The experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina suggests that the issue of transition
towards sustainable market based economy is not simply a question of recovering and improving the
utilisation of the existing production capacity, but of rebuilding the production base of the economy. This
is a process that takes time, substantial resources and an appropriate set of policies.
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As in other transition countries, privatisation is taken to be the key for restructuring the economic base of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most donors have made it clear from the start that only the private sector could
benefit from the reconstruction assistance. But at the same time, privatisation has become primarily a
political issue, taken out of the context of reconstruction and transition as such. The passage of relevant
legislation was delayed and privatisation in both entities only started in 1999. However, there are still
many problems in the functioning of the relevant institutions, prospective buyers are few and far between,
which combined with the politicisation of the entire process, is likely to prolong the sale of state assets.
The dominant focus of the reconstruction programme on supporting private, almost exclusively small and
medium enterprises, has been particularly harmful to large industrial enterprises, which were once the
main source of employment and output.
Unemployment remains one of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s main problems, which threatens to undermine
whatever progress has been achieved in stabilising the country after the war. Unemployment is
particularly high among refugees and displaced persons. The reconstruction programme, besides its
general effect on restarting economic activity and employment, has also included targeted programmes
which were supposed to generate both temporary and permanent employment. Targeted programmes,
such as public works, micro-credit lines to industry and agriculture, have generally resulted in modest
and largely short-term employment. In the absence of a widespread recovery, the overall job generation
effect of the reconstruction programme has fallen short of needs.
Most of the new jobs are linked to reconstruction and public administration. Very few jobs have been
created through manufacturing, since most of the schemes have bypassed this sector dominated by the
large state owned enterprises. Public administration is the only sector where the number of employees
exceeds the pre-war figure, which puts additional strain on already precarious public finances. Restricted
opportunities for productive employment of a large number of demobilised soldiers, which is likely to
increase with further cuts in defence expenditures, is of particular concern for its potential security
implications. Given the complexity of the economic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the fact that
economic reforms needed to sustain growth take time, much greater attention should have been given to
the issue of job generation in the context of economic reconstruction and transition.
In spite of the novelties of the reconstruction programme, which build on some of the experiences of
transition in other ex-socialist countries, and an amount of aid judged to be the highest per capita in
recent history, Bosnia-Herzegovina is far from being a sustainable economy and society. Its economy is
donor dependent, and the presence of international military and police force is still indispensable for
keeping peace and order in the country. Institutions are weak or non-functioning. There is a lack of
political consensus at the local level on the key issues of economic reform as well as the implementation
of other aspects of the peace agreement, which are the key blocks in rebuilding Bosnia-Herzegovina as
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a unified state. Constitutional arrangements set out in the Dayton peace agreement have proved to be an
impediment to reconstruction and development. The reconstruction programme itself has been based on
a traditional perception that development is essentially a financial and technical matter, which combined
with the transition policy prescriptions, has failed to deal with the key obstacles to economic and societal
normalisation. As a consequence of all this, continuous and concerted pressure of the international
community remains essential for sustaining the reconstruction momentum as well as safeguarding peace.
III. Policy Issues
Reconstruction in the Balkans has to be conceived not as a post-conflict strategy, as was the case after
World War II, but as a conflict prevention strategy. The key to conflict prevention in this part of the
world is, as has already been stressed, restoration of the rule of law both as it applies externally to
relations between states and as it applies internally to everyday life. The pervasive tendencies for
clientelism and criminalisation which dominate societies in the region, have to be countered by a system
based on respect for law and democratic participation and which can provide a framework for the
rejuvenation of the formal economy.
Indeed, restoration of the rule of law is paradoxically both the precondition and goal of any
reconstruction effort. There will be no material improvement in the region without a clear legal
framework for a market economy and without the eventual elimination of the dominance of the shadow
economy. But it is difficult to conceive of the restoration of the rule of law without democratisation, that
is to say, without the existence of political regimes that accept the rules within which democracy
operates, in particular the notion that conflicts have to be managed in a non-violent way. However, the
process of democratisation in turn depends on security both physical and material; it is the atmosphere of
fear and insecurity that sustain extremist rulers and generates conflict.
In our view, this vicious circle can only be broken through simultaneous efforts in the fields of security,
democratisation and the economy. There are ‘islands of hope’ in the Balkans – regions or localities or
groups of people who are struggling to create a sense of political or economic normality. The challenge is
how to build up democratic alternatives to the criminal systems generated by war and nationalism. In this
paper, we place particular emphasis on a change of regime in Serbia. Although a change of regime in
Serbia does not amount to democratisation, it could help to unblock the situation and allow the
beginnings of a process in which improvements in security contribute to political loosening, which in turn
would allow for positive developments in the economy. In what follows, we consider each of the main
fields in turn; and then discuss what this means for EU strategy.
24
III.1 Political Settlement and Security
Perhaps the most salient feature of the current situation in the Balkans is the gap in the provision of
security, both external and internal. For the time being, that gap can only be filled by the international
community.
Up to now, it is possible to distinguish broadly two approaches that have been adopted by the
international community. One is the so-called realist approach that focuses on the issues of borders and
external security. The realist approach aims at solving problems from above and focuses on borders and
external security. The policies adopted place the emphasis on pressure on states or warring parties. They
include top-down diplomacy, backed by threats of bombing or sanctions and/or conditionality attached
to aid. One variant of the realist approach envisages a solution based on the creation of ethnically
homogeneous states and various forms of partition and/or power sharing. Another variant, which is
favoured by the United States and is therefore dominant, treats Serbia as a ‘rogue state’ to be excluded
from the international community. Neither variant is able to provide a basis for long-term stability. Both
variants leave important sections of society excluded and dissatisfied – refugees in the first case and
Serbs in the second – and neither copes directly with the underlying social conditions.
An alternative approach could be described as the humanitarian approach where the problem is
perceived primarily as a problem of human rights and of legitimacy. Efforts to protect people, through for
example safe havens or humanitarian corridors, to assist the return of refugees, or to support civil society
are typical of a humanitarian approach. A humanitarian approach combines ‘top-down’ policies with
‘bottom-up’ measures. The emphasis is on the establishment of a transnational rule of law which could
provide the basis for agreements about borders and status, and which would combine external and
internal security. What does such an approach entail in the current situation?
1) The international community has to make it clear that it is willing to stay in the region as long as it
takes to reach a permanent political agreement. This applies both to Kosovo and to Bosnia-
Herzegovina and, if necessary, also elsewhere. Moreover, it also has to make it clear that it is ready
to deploy troops to underwrite a future agreement.
 
2) The international community has to assist with internal as well as external security tasks. This could
mean that troops have to undertake policing jobs, or that additional international police are sent, or
that reform of local police and judiciaries are undertaken with the assistance of the international
community.
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3) The international presence in FYR Macedonia and also Montenegro may need to be strengthened,
as long as there is an explicit request by the governments concerned. This could also be an
international civil presence or an OSCE security presence.
 
4) As part of the Stability Pact, the international community needs to develop proposals for common
security arrangements for the region as a whole which would encompass overall reductions in
military spending, co-operation among armed forces, civilian control of public security services,
elimination of paramilitary groups and other private security forces, control of the arms trade,
particularly small arms, and common institutions for conflict resolution.
 
5) Such security arrangements could be envisaged within an international co-operative framework that
includes both NATO and Russia. One possibility is to build on the Partnership for Peace agreements
that have been signed between NATO and several countries of the region and to supplement these
agreements with a multilateral approach that includes Russia. Another possibility is to establish a
Balkan Helsinki process within the framework of OSCE.
There are currently some 80,000 NATO troops in the region, including 30,000 SFOR troops in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, between 32,000 and 35,000 KFOR troops in Kosovo, and a further 10,000 troops in
FYR Macedonia and 5,000 in Albania in support of the Kosovo operation. There are also Russian
troops as well as troops from neutral countries in Bosnia and Kosovo. These troops, especially in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, do reduce the risk of another war as long as they remain in the region.
However, they see their role primarily as one of providing external security. Thus the main task in
Bosnia-Herzegovina is to separate opposing forces and to control heavy weapons. Although they arrest
war criminals, they do not undertake what are traditionally internal security roles; they do not protect
returning refugees or help to provide conditions conducive to refugees returns – this is considered to be
the job of the police. In Kosovo, the troops are supposed to demilitarise the KLA and protect minorities
but they have not been effective in this role so far. They are likely to be most effective in preventing the
return of Serbian forces. Thus the presence of outside troops tends to freeze the conflicts that are the
immediate reason for war but, as yet, they have failed to cope with the underlying social conditions that
lead to violence.
The temporary arrangements that characterise the security situation in the Balkans are, of course,
expensive and uncertain. Within this framework, which includes ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ protectorates, the
prospects for reconstruction and sustainable development are inevitably weak. The issues of status and
territory do have to be resolved. But they have to be resolved by the local actors. The international
community cannot impose a solution from above, but it can help provide a long-term framework within
which these issues can be resolved. One of the main errors of the international community up to now has
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been to focus on possible solutions or outcomes rather than on process and method. The question of
where borders are situated can only be settled within a framework in which human rights are respected
and conflicts are resolved through non-violent methods. What matters is not so much a specific solution,
but what constitutes a legal and legitimate method of resolving these issues.
Many in the international community are currently arguing that a strong position needs to be taken from
now concerning respect for borders and that the independence of Montenegro and Kosovo should be
opposed because this will encourage further disintegration and Balkanisation as well as conflict between
Albania and Serbia. There is much justification for this argument. On the other hand, the Yugoslav
federal constitution does include a right for republics to secede. There is surely a political case for
arguing that since other former Yugoslav republics have been recognised, it would be wrong to deny
Montenegro the same opportunity, especially in view of its current situation as hostage to the Milosevic
regime in Belgrade. Moreover, while the legal status of former provinces may be different from former
republics which have the right to secede, is it not politically wrong to deny this right to Kosovo on the
basis of a legal technicality?
We argue that neither position should be adopted. Any number of solutions are possible. What is
important is that any solution is legalised and legitimised and that a politically acceptable framework for
making a decision be established. For this to be the case, any permanent political solution has to satisfy
the following three conditions:
· it has to be acceptable to the parties involved in the conflict
· it has to be acceptable to other affected countries in the region
· it has to be internationally acceptable
At present, however, the prospects for permanent solutions of this kind in any of the conflicts mentioned
above seem remote. A precondition for this kind of agreement is acceptance of the rule of law both
between states and within states - the notion that conflicts cannot be resolved through the use of force. It
is impossible to envisage respect for the rule of law so long as extremist politicians remain in power,
especially but not only in Serbia. And this in turn depends on how far the social conditions underlying
violence can be changed. The most the international community can do is to try to create an environment
conducive to the establishment of the rule of law through helping to provide security and to reduce the
atmosphere of fear that nurtures extremist politicians.
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III.2 Democratisation
What is happening throughout the Balkans could be described as an increasing polarisation between
pro- and anti-democratic forces, between those seeking to mend the broken relationships in society and
those who thrive on the negative dynamics of political extremism and criminality. The latter are
strengthened by war and violence. The former have an opportunity to develop in conditions of relative
stability, as was the case to some extent after the Dayton agreement and before the recent Kosovo
crisis. They benefit from co-operation across borders and from international assistance.
The reconstruction effort has to find ways to strengthen the pro-democratic forces in society. In
particular, in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, much of the European policy towards the Balkans and
the Balkan policy towards Europe will depend on political developments in Yugoslavia, and that mainly
means Serbia. At the moment, there are a number of unresolved issues as far as Serbia is concerned and
those illustrate quite well the security, political and economic problems discussed above. It is worth
noting, however, that it is equally important to strengthen the process of democratisation among Serbia’s
neighbours. A change of regime in Croatia, which is possible after the next elections, the success of the
democratisation process in Montenegro, or further moves towards integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
will also have knock-on effects on Serbia.
In what follows, we start by outlining the problems of Serbia and Kosovo and then put forward some
more general proposals for the region as a whole.
Regime change in Belgrade
For both security and economic reasons, a regional approach is virtually impossible to conceive without
political change in Serbia. From the point of view of security, Serbia is an example of a state without
clear borders and this poses serious risks for the region as a whole. On one hand, the borders with
Bosnia-Herzegovina are fuzzy, to say the least. On the other hand, the internal borders with Kosovo and
Montenegro are in the process of becoming international borders.
From the economic point of view, non-inclusion of Serbia into the regional plans for the Balkans would
present serious problems not only for Serbia but also for the wider region. Though it would be an
overstatement to say that Serbia holds the power of veto on Balkan integration and on the integration of
the Balkans into the European Union, there is no doubt that both would be easier if Serbia were
involved. There is no need to stress the obvious fact that regional and European integration would also
be beneficial to Serbia.
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From the political point of view, it is evident that none of the regional and international interests can be
satisfied without a political change in Serbia which would lead to the democratisation of the country.
None of the Serbian interests can be secured with the current regime. This being the case, the key
question is how can the forces for change in Serbia co-operate with the international community and be
helped by it?
Some Western leaders have suggested that Yugoslavia should be excluded from the reconstruction
process until the Serbian people dispose of the Milosevic regime. The problem with this approach is that
it increases the sense of isolation and victimisation that may actually help to underwrite support for the
current regime. Some lessons should be learned from the experience with sanctions against Iraq. What is
needed instead is an approach that isolates the regime while ending the isolation of Serbian society. The
goal is to provide assistance in a way that sidelines the regime.
There are two ways in which this might be done. First, the EU and the international factors involved in
the region should give legitimacy to the opposition by including their representatives in the ongoing
international political activities. Opposition should include not only party leaders but also representatives
of civil society – independent intellectuals and NGOs.  Where possible they should also find ways to
encourage communication and exchange – through town twinnings, student exchanges, media training
and other forms of civil society networking. Secondly, given that Kosovo, although still nominally part of
FR Yugoslavia, is under the control of UN and NATO forces, and also given that the Montenegrin
government is co-operative, the international agencies should use these channels to help opposition
forces and private businesses within Serbia financially and economically. This would require that the
current system of sanctions be replaced by a system of selective sanctions aimed at isolating the current
government, but not the Serbian economy and polity. In particular, humanitarian assistance should be
provided through non-governmental channels directly to those in need.
At present, sanctions only apply to finance, travel for 300 identified members of the regime and to oil,
although some countries, notably Russia, the Ukraine and Bulgaria have not imposed oil sanctions. If
heating oil is in short supply, this is either because of financial constraints and/or because the regime is
only willing to supply oil to the security forces and is using the sanctions as a scapegoat. The mayor of
Nis, for example, has suggested that, if the international community were prepared to pay for heating oil,
he would go personally to the Bulgarian border together with a group of citizens to escort the oil to his
city and to make sure the oil is only used for humanitarian purposes.
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An international civil administration in Kosovo
The United Nations has been slow to establish an international civil administration, especially policing.
Morover, as in Bosnia, there is a plethora of international governmental and non-governmental
organisations all competing for power with locally organised structures. Already disillusion and frustration
is developing within ethnic Albanian society; while the desperation of the non-Albanian minorities
represents a serious cause of future problems. There is a risk that the province could develop into a
haven for various criminal gangs and that authoritarian tendencies among the Kosovar Albanians may
gather pace.
It is important that the UN Administration develop some coherence in the international approach
towards Kosovo; there is a real risk that the international community will find itself protecting a closed-in
exclusivist authoritarian society. It must find ways to support the development of legitimate self-organised
structures and create an environment conducive to democracy. The focus has to be on ‘bottom-up’
functions; the provision of security; minority rights, the organisation of elections, and support for civil
society. There is a tendency, drawing on the experience of Bosnia, to establish various power-sharing
arrangements with the Serbian community. This could turn out to be counter-productive given that the
Albanian population represents the overwhelming majority. In the end, Serbs will only return if a
democratic safe society can be built. In particular, it is important to avoid the creation of divided cities
and ethnic enclaves as these could become the source of long-term tension and instability.
Assistance to civil society throughout the region
This is crucial both as a way of strengthening pro-democracy groups and as a way of integrating the
region at the level of society. Negative nationalist and criminal networks are much stronger in this part of
the world than civic-minded networks. There should be a formal citizens’ dimension to the Stability Pact,
through which citizens groups could have direct access to decision-makers. This would also provide a
mechanism for including Serbian society while continuing to isolate the regime.  Assistance to civil society
could include:
· Education. It is vital to invest in the human resources that are needed to build a democratic
political culture. The European Union’s programmes on higher education should be extended to
the whole region. They need to encourage student and faculty exchanges within the region as
well as with the rest of Europe. There is an urgent need to provide assistance aimed at the
reform of curriculums and to provide appropriate teaching material including electronic sources
and new textbooks especially in the social sciences and humanities. It is also important to
encourage the teaching of the different cultures and languages of the region and to organise
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Summer Schools and other events which bring together students, young people and teachers
from all over the region.
 
· Independent media. Countering state propaganda is an essential element in any programme of
democratisation. At present, television tends to be dominated by governments, although those
with satellite dishes have access to international networks. This includes both the well-known
networks like CNN, Sky or BBC World Service and programmes put out by Diaspora groups,
such as the Albanian service broadcast from Geneva. The international administration in Bosnia-
Herzegovina did take the lead in initiating a countrywide independent television network and
although this does not yet have very wide access, it has had some influence. In the main,
independent media tend to be newspapers and magazines or local radio. Independent local radio
has had a significant influence especially in Serbia. It is very important to provide material
assistance to these independent sources of information and commentary as well as other kinds of
assistance such as training and participation in workshops and conferences where key political
issues are discussed. It is also important to break the monopoly of state television in several
countries, but especially Serbia. One proposal is to establish an independent station in Pristine.
 
· Municipalities. It is important to encourage participation at local levels and to build up
municipalities as a check on centralised power. Town twinning within the region and between the
region and the rest of Europe is a way engaging a wider array of people in transnational
exchanges, fostering discussion about democracy at local levels and even providing various
forms of concrete assistance. The experience of Tuzla in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which twinned
with the town of Bologna at the height of the war there and has received assistance from a
number of cities in Western Europe, offers a concrete example of the advantages of this strategy.
 
· Entrepreneurs and Trade Unions. The business community has an interest in the construction
of a rule of law and the elimination of illegal trading and various forms of ‘protection’. The
establishment of a Balkan Business Forum could provide an opportunity for businessmen from
the whole region to meet each other and discuss common interests and problems and even to act
as a civil society lobby. The same could apply to trade union organisations.
 
· NGOs. Assistance needs to be provided to a variety of NGOs ranging from those who provide
local social services to those who act as advocacy groups on human rights and poverty issues.
NGOs can provide a mechanism for individual participation in civic life, they can help to spread
the values and norms which underpin democracy and the rule of law, and they can put pressure
on governments to check abuse and violations of the law. It is especially important to encourage
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women’s groups, youth groups and independent trades unions and to provide funding to help
establish Balkan-wide networks.
· Religious institutions. In this part of the world, churches and mosques have often been the site
of nationalist propaganda. However, there have always been religious voices putting forward a
message of peace and reconciliation. In recent months, constructive statements from the Serbian
Orthodox Church have been heard. Links with Churches in the rest of Europe as well as
ecumenical dialogue could help to stimulate and empower the more positive elements in the
religious institutions.
III.3 Economic Recovery
Economic recovery in the post-communist Balkans and the progressive integration of all the countries of
the region into the European system present some major challenges. The fundamental problems faced by
these countries are the dramatic decline and even disappearance of productive capacity, the smallness of
the regional market and the high level of investment risks. We argue that while the standard recipes for
recovery/liberalisation and monetary stabilisation – need to be applied, they will not be effective unless
accompanied by fiscal reform, public investment and micro-economic restructuring.
As the experience of transition clearly illustrates, the key issue is precisely the one of rebuilding the
economic base of the Balkan countries. The experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina moreover underlines that
the dominant approach, while focusing primarily on the issues of physical rebuilding and macroeconomic
stabilisation, has neglected the importance of the process of micro-restructuring, which is necessary if the
initial gains from the reconstruction effort are to be sustained. Macroeconomic stability by itself or the
trade openness for that matter cannot accomplish the process of restructuring and modernisation that
these economies must undergo in order to become internationally competitive. In fact, in some cases,
good short term macroeconomic indicators, e.g, price and exchange rate stability, tend to disguise
serious mismanagement of these countries. Effective enterprise restructuring is the key to strong growth
and exports, and a set of policies supportive of these processes must be included in any programme of
reconstruction.
Macroeconomic Measures
Trade policy is the first and key area to look into. The relevant considerations in devising the trade
regime and policy are the following: (i) the Balkans are effectively (despite the existing barriers)
integrated into the EU, because the EU is and will continue to be their dominant trading partner, (ii)
regional trade is, in most cases, small and not expanding fast, (iii) barriers to trade both regional and
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those with the EU are significant, and (iv) contractual trade relations with the EU have an important
element of asymmetry against the Balkan countries, because of the high level of protection of agricultural
markets in the EU (Gligorov, 1999; see also Tables 2 and 3 in Annex I). Liberalisation of trade within
the region is vital both to restore the regional market and for political and security reasons. Proposals for
liberalising trade with the EU are discussed below.
Monetary policy is the other obvious area to consider. The following considerations are of major
importance: (i) the EU is a monetary union, (ii) the German mark is the preferred currency in the region,
(iii) monetary authorities have little or no credibility throughout the region, and (iv) the bulk of
investments will have to come from abroad.
Taking into account the existing situation, the choice of monetary policy should be determined by the
considerations of price stability and of the growth of output. The relationship between stability and
growth may not be a straightforward one in many cases, but in the case of the Balkans it could be
argued that, for reasons of history and geography, the choices have either already been made or are
quite limited. The economies have already made the choice in terms of stability: reliance on foreign
currency. Also, their growth will depend significantly on foreign investments. That leads to the use of
foreign currency as an anchor for monetary policy. However, this still does not determine completely the
actual choice of the exchange rate regime.
Experience with the fixed exchange rate regimes is not altogether encouraging. Experience with the
currency boards seems to indicate that this arrangement is preferable to the other types of fixed
exchange rate regimes in cases in which significant inflows of foreign money is to be expected.
Obviously, if it is to be expected that there will be a significant and sustained flow of foreign investment
and finance into the Balkans, the currency board would be preferable for a small and open economy
which has had bad history with monetary policy (this description fits most of the Balkan countries).
However, if, for various reasons, the inflow of foreign finance disappoints, the currency board
arrangement can prove to be a liability, because it will deliver stability, but would sap growth.
What goes for currency boards goes for euroisation too (see also Calvo, 1999). The advantage of
euroisation over currency boards is in the elimination of the residual exchange rate risk. This should,
ceteris paribus, deliver lower interest rates in the euro zone than in the zone with a currency board. Still,
the exchange rate risk is only one of the country-specific risks. Other elements of the overall country risk
would remain even if the country were to adopt the euro. Albania would not stop being Albania because
it adopted euro. It may be the case that the country risk would be lower for the lack of the devaluation
risk, but even that may not be the case. Of course, if the banking system were to be run by foreign
banks, euroisation would be the right policy choice. However, the rehabilitation and the privatisation of
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the banking systems in the Balkans may take a while. And, in addition, the key issue is what can the
choice of the monetary regime contribute to restructuring, not what is the best monetary regime in a
country where the banking system is mostly owned by foreigners.
Therefore, the choice of monetary policy in the region depends on the overall economic expectations,
which depend on all those regimes and policies that support investments and growth. In the end, if
integration progresses, the region will join EU monetary union. However, the way to approach this need
not be uniform. Monetary policies differ in the Central European countries (mainly as a consequence of
the difference in the degree of the effective openness of the respective economy and due to different
levels of exposure to foreign debt, accumulated and current) though they all aim at joining the euro zone.
The same could be the case in the Balkans.
With this, it is natural to turn to issues of fiscal policy. Throughout the Balkans, the states are either
bankrupt, run high budget deficits or have a hard time maintaining some kind of fiscal stability. The fiscal
problems are essentially the consequence of (i) the collapse of economic activity, and (ii) inefficient fiscal
systems.
What the whole debate about the virtues of supply-side economics has come to is the obvious point that
growth is good for public finances. The key issue, however, is what system of public finance is good for
growth? The current situation in the Balkans is a combination of high taxes, and other sources of
revenue, that are a consequence of the collapsing tax base and of tax evasion, rent-seeking and
corruption that are, at least partly, a consequence of the high tax rates. Thus, the obvious advice for
fiscal reform is to lower the tax rates and to widen the tax base.
This type of fiscal reform would solve only one set of problems. The other would have to do with the
fiscal deficit and with the level of public expenditure. For instance, the obligations embedded in social
funds can hardly be honoured in full. Thus, a reform of the system of social security is unavoidable. In
addition, the set of social services provided by the state has to be re-examined. Finally, much of what
passes as the state’s function as a redistributor of resources has to be reformed.
What emerges as a system of public finance in the Balkans may very well be a lean state that supports
the allocation of resources, but not so much social solidarity and social justice. Whether this would be
supportive of long-term growth is another matter. It could be argued that the role of the state in the
reconstruction and development of the Balkans should be quite significant. However, the state in the
Balkans has proved not to be altogether modernising. Therefore, a small, but efficient state, could be the
most one can hope for.
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Microeconomic Measures
In a classic article written in 1943, Rosenstein-Rodan argued that in a backward area like South East
Europe, the problems of reconstruction were essentially microeconomic in nature. This is still true today,
although the priorities may be different.
The first priority, emphasised by Rosenstein-Rodan, concerns the upgrading of the infrastructure. The
costs of transportation must be brought down, otherwise trade will not prove to be the engine of growth.
In addition nowadays, telecommunications are vitally important. The focus should not be merely on
physical repair and upgrade but important policy issues related to finance and the quality of services
ought to be addressed simultaneously. Every effort should be made to reintegrate infrastructure at the
regional level so as to benefit from the economies of scale and ensure that the level of services is
sustained. Under the donors’ pressure to see the projects implemented quickly, there is a tendency to go
for partial solutions which are not technically optimal and are more expensive.
The second priority is the development of the private sector. It can be argued that private investment
will not be forthcoming, at least not as much as would be desirable, if the local risks are not somehow
insured against. This means that as long as private business and especially the local banking sector is not
developed enough, investments would have to be insured by the more developed governments. The key
issue here is not so much to have price stability, but to have a sound and efficient banking system.
In addition, there is a need for specific schemes, which will facilitate the start up of new enterprises,
particularly as the process of privatisation advances. This is necessary because most of these countries
do not have substantial experience in micro-business enterprise, particularly outside sectors such as
trade, catering, crafts and construction. This, among other things, involves more sophisticated forms of
micro-credit finance.
A third priority is industrial restructuring. It can be argued that the foreign trade sector must become
the engine of growth. Nowadays there is a need for a strategic vision of the kind of viable economic
profile to which regions or localities can aspire. Most of these economies are burdened with a large
proportion of economically non-viable capital stock, and its replacement is costly and time consuming.
The manufacturing sector is usually dominated by mid-tech industries whose product quality is typically
low; the proportion of heavy industry is generally significant.
What is needed is a sectoral approach to industrial restructuring along the lines the EU is trying to
implement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This would involve a strategic review of all sectors, particularly in
industries with a significant domestic resource content, support to viable companies including the
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preparation of privatisation plans, training, encouraging industrial co-operation and the development of
industrial associations. In this context the issue of large state enterprises that are too big to be left to the
market to restructure should also be addressed. Some form of support for their restructuring is
necessary. They have been left in a conceptual and policy vacuum during the process of transition, which
has devastated some of these economies’ most technically advanced productive capacity.  There is also
a need to carefully design the donor programmes of financial assistance to enterprises, particularly
various credit lines. All too often, donors are reluctant to provide finance for the purchase of equipment
and instead focus on small scale credit towards working capital, which in the absence of domestic credit,
prevents many enterprises from restarting their activity. Very often, what some of these firms need is a
major injection of technology, capital and managerial know-how to turn themselves into a viable business
enterprise.
In many cases, this involves a redefinition of a business portfolio, organisational redesign, technological
restructuring and the redefinition of the target markets. Corporate governance has not been given
adequate attention in the process of transition. Existing companies need technical assistance to help them
create a new business structure, which would have a potential to survive in the changed environment.
This in turn points to the need to formulate some sort of overall development strategy in the process of
reconstruction.
Given the scale of change these countries are undergoing, there is a widespread lack of vision at the
enterprise level as to what their competitive advantage will be in the long term. Instead, an overwhelming
sense of uncertainty and lack of strategic thinking prevail, which reflect the lack of interest in engaging in
production, and an attitude of going for quick gains, often in activities of speculative character.
Assistance which would improve the level of information exchange and the co-operation between
business people in the region would be helpful in breaking up the short-term and locally oriented
mentality that are characteristic of the region’s business community.
Special attention has to be given to the regional dimension in the process of economic recovery.
Municipalities and other bodies dealing with regional development issues should be supported through a
range of activities involving the local business community. It is possible to organise training programmes,
support business advice centres etc. More flexible schemes that quickly respond to requests at the local
level could be developed.
On the basis of the description of the current economic situation in the Balkans and in view of the tasks
that reconstruction and recovery should accomplish, our recommendations with respect to economic
policy measures are as follows:
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Monetary policy: Given the current debate on euroisation, the initial dilemma in the Balkan countries
might be whether to pursue any monetary policy at all. However, given that monetary policy is pursued,
the real issue becomes the choice of policy. Based on the experience of other countries in transition and
emerging markets in general, it can be argued that an independent central bank (instrument independent
and not necessarily goal independent) should be the aim. In addition, monetary policy should aim at an
interest rate that would be convergent, over a reasonable period of time, to that in the EU. The other
powers within the jurisdiction of a central bank (e.g., licensing of commercial banks, supervision of the
banking system, restructuring of commercial banks) should be geared towards delivering a low interest
rate, i.e., a low cost of financial intermediation.
Exchange rate policy: Assuming that most of the countries in the Balkans will choose to rely on
monetary policy, the choice of exchange rate policy will depend on the time distribution of the goals of
monetary policy. In a number of cases, fixed exchange rate regimes may have to be used in the period
when stability is the dominant worry of the monetary policy. Once policy can focus on growth, one or
another type of  less irrevocably fixed exchange rate regime should be chosen. The exchange rate policy
and monetary policy should, in any case, aim at an optimal mix between exchange rate and interest rate
volatility as answers to external and internal shocks. Support of the export sector as a prime motor of
development and integration with the EU should be a major consideration.
Fiscal policy: Budgets have to be financed from revenues and public expenditures have to be at a
sustainable level. These fiscal goals imply that budget deficits should be kept at reasonably low levels
and that the share of public expenditure of the GDP should not be too high (e.g., not higher than one
third). As for the system of taxation, it should be simple, business- and employment-friendly as well as
convergent with that of the EU (e.g., it should make use of VAT). The tax structure must be targeted in
order to support corporate development and thus the growth of employment. Long-term sustainability of
social security arrangements (involving substantial reforms) should be high on the agenda.
Trade policy: Regional trade liberalisation is almost mandated by the Stability Pact. The appropriate
arrangement would be some kind of a regional free trade area. A number of countries in the region are
already members of CEFTA, which means that the two free trade areas could eventually merge into one.
However, the key issue is that of trade liberalisation and integration with the EU. Irrespective of the
ways in which the process of integration will actually proceed, it should in principle follow the logic of the
Europe Agreements extending to cover the so-called sensitive areas too (e.g., agriculture). This means
that liberalisation of trade between the countries in the Balkans and the EU should be asymmetric in
favour of the former; in other words, EU markets should be opened up more quickly to imports from the
Balkan countries. The added protection of the economies in the Balkans should as a rule not extend over
more than the medium term and should be designed in such a way as to minimise special protection and
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rent-seeking in general. Given these goals and instruments of trade policy, it is to be understood that the
main aims of trade policy are allocational and developmental, not fiscal.
Labour market policies: Given the high level of unemployment in the region, labour markets and labour
market policies are essential. Three issues are of major importance: first, bringing down existing barriers
to employment; second, legalising black market employment, when and where possible; and third,
increasing and upgrading training and re-training activities. Strong emphasis should also be placed on
reducing long-term and youth unemployment.
Investment policies: The economic policy measures discussed above should lead to an increase in
investment opportunities and in the level of investment. Nevertheless, given the general backwardness of
the region and given the significant level of microeconomic risk, additional measures should be taken
both domestically and internationally to spur investment. This means that the specific risks should be
identified and financial institutions devised that would insure investors against these risks. This should be
done either via the existing international financial institutions, through the European institutions or through
a regional development bank that would be institutionally connected with the development and
investment banks in Washington and in Europe. Given that foreign direct investment has proven to be an
essential agent of modernisation and development, capital account transactions should be liberalised
gradually with the view of securing sustainable and longer term financial inflows rather than short-term
capital movements.
Financial sector development: Experience has shown how extremely vulnerable and of key importance
is the financial system in transition is. Lessons can be learned concerning the methods and timing of bank
restructuring and the sound development of other institutions of financial intermediation. Attention must
be given to the close monitoring and the setting-up of regulatory agencies and the building-up of the
required expertise. Distortions in the lending operations of financial institutions in the transition are well
known and could be partially corrected through the setting up of specific institutions (such as those
targeting SMEs or those supporting exports). However, the root causes of such distortions should be
dealt with (entry barriers for new entrants, information problems, inherited and evolving stock of bad
loans, macroeconomic conditions).
Reconstruction policies: The reconstruction policies designed within the Stability Pact or in other
regional initiatives should aim at those reconstruction efforts that would support higher and sustainable
investments, specifically of indigenous corporate development (see some of the recent failures of
international efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina in this respect). This means that reconstruction should be
aimed at the removal of those fixed costs that are making individual investment projects less than
profitable. For instance, the reconstruction and development of infrastructure should have the required
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beneficial effect on the overall business activity. Also, in the longer term, reconstruction should aim at
supporting industrial production and the spread of modern technology, though in the short and medium
term most of the employment will have to come from small and medium sized enterprises specialising in
services. To support these activities, the reconstruction should aim at creating financial facilities that
would support credits for these kinds of activities.
Human and social capabilities: The process of reconstruction and development requires investment in
human and social capabilities. There is a general presumption that human capabilities are abundant in the
region, though concrete studies are lacking. On the other hand, social capabilities are generally believed
to be underdeveloped. In any case, the reconstruction and development process should take investment
into human and social capabilities seriously and should rely on significant resources devoted to technical
assistance and to institution building. Such programmes already exist and should be expended and made
more targeted and efficient. External assistance will also be vital in supporting and reforming social
security systems, which are in near collapse in most countries in the Balkans.
IV. European and Regional Integration
‘Joining Europe’ in this part of the world has a powerful symbolic significance. On the one hand, the goal
of ‘joining Europe’ has been assimilated into the discourse of nationalism as some ethnic groups claim to
be more 'European’ than others. Indeed, it can be argued that competition to join the European Union
was a factor in the disintegrative process as better-off regions tried to separate themselves from more
backward regions. On the other hand, the term ‘European values’ is widely used by those who favour
democracy to contrast themselves from the exclusive and illegitimate stance of the nationalists.
There has been until now a patchwork of institutional and other relations between individual countries of
the Balkans and the EU.  Diversity and bilateralism have been the name of the game, despite various
periodic attempts to add some coherence to the policy pursued by the Union towards the region as a
whole.
With one member country in the region, since Greece joined in 1981, the EU now has extensive bilateral
relations with two other Balkan countries, namely Bulgaria and Romania, which are included in the list of
11 (to date) candidate countries (10 Central and Eastern European countries plus Cyprus). These
relations include trade liberalisation measures in the context of the Europe Agreements; the provision of
financial aid, mostly in the form of technical assistance, under the PHARE programme; regulatory
alignment as part of the preparation for full integration in the European internal market; and
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institutionalised dialogue. These are all now being complemented by Accession Partnerships, which will
allow the flow of pre-accession aid to the candidate countries.
However, both Bulgaria and Romania have been until now on the slow track leading to accession,
because of the relatively limited progress they have registered in meeting the criteria for membership set
out by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. On the basis of the progress reports published by
the European Commission in October this year (European Commission, 1999), it now appears very
likely that the two countries will begin accession negotiations sometime in the year 2000, even though the
date of entry may still look rather distant.
Turkey has a customs union agreement as well as a long and turbulent history of institutional relations
with the EEC (and later the EU). Its status, concerning eligibility for membership, is still not clearly
defined, although there is now a serious possibility that it will be granted the status of candidate country
at the European Council in Helsinki next December. It will, however, have a long distance to cover in
meeting the political and economic criteria for membership.
The successor republics of former Yugoslavia and Albania are trailing far behind in the race to Brussels:
FYR Macedonia and Albania have co-operation agreements, and the others much less, while relations
with FR Yugoslavia have been completely frozen for several years, marked by a whole range of official
restrictions and embargoes. On the other hand, Slovenia, also a constituent republic of former
Yugoslavia, has been promoted out of the Balkan league. Accession negotiations with the EU were
opened in March 1998.
The emphasis had been until recently on bilateralism and differential treatment of individual countries. The
Royaumont process initiated in 1995 and the so-called Regional Approach towards the Western
Balkans adopted in 1997 were the exceptions, which did not substantially change the rule. In recent
years, initiatives aiming at regional co-operation in the Balkans have come from both inside and outside
the region, with relatively few, albeit not insignificant, results until now.
During the painful transition from communism in the Balkans, marked by the bloody disintegration of
former Yugoslavia, the dramatic decline in living standards and the criminalisation of large parts of the
economy and society in the region as a whole, the EU has evidently had little success in trying to export
stability, democracy and economic development. As it befits a civilian power, the influence which the EU
can exert on third countries is generally a function of trade, aid and, most importantly when it comes to
European countries, the prospect of membership. The further the prospect of membership, the smaller
the influence. Trade and aid are in turn partly dependent on it. This general rule fits very well in the case
of the Balkan countries. Furthermore, given the underdeveloped nature of the Common Foreign and
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Security Policy (CFSP) until now, when the guns began to sound in the region, the EU had little or
nothing to say.
A New Policy for the Balkans
The EU will have to play a central role in any reconstruction effort in the Balkans. It is, of course, a
question of moral responsibility; but it is also a matter of wise investment for a region which is close to
home. Instability tends to spill over national frontiers; and so do economic and political refugees. Indeed,
it can be argued that the future legitimacy of the Union, as has historically been the case for other political
entities, depends on the extent to which it is seen to provide both external and internal security. The
founders of the European Union envisaged economic integration largely as a means to an end; the goal
was to prevent another war in Europe. The prevention of further wars in Southeastern Europe can be
viewed as an essential component of any future European identity.
There are already concrete signs, such as the initiative which has led to the adoption of the Stability Pact
and the proposals on the Stabilisation and Association Process for the countries of the Western Balkans,
which indicate that the EU may be ready to move in this direction. The new Commission should be
expected to act as a driving force. Yet, there is still a big gap between general declarations of intent and
hard commitments, both in terms of financial resources and institutional perspectives. As the sight of
wretched refugees and bombed sites fades away from our television screens, there is indeed a danger
that politicians in the prosperous countries of Europe will shift their attention to other domestic priorities,
thus leaving the Balkans trapped once again in the vicious circle of economic misery, crippled
democracy and insecurity, which has been repeatedly made worse in the past by destabilising foreign
interventions.
For the EU to play an effective stabilisation and modernisation role in the region, it will require:
· political will
· financial resources
· innovative ideas.
It will have to offer a clear prospect for the progressive integration of all countries concerned into the
European system, even though it will have to make clear that full membership of the EU is not likely to
happen before long. The Union needs to enlarge its membership in stages, eventually incorporating all
European countries which may wish to join, without sacrificing the goal of ever deepening integration.
Generosity and flexibility will need to be combined with conditionality and continuous monitoring. This in
turn means that a regional approach is not incompatible with differential treatment of individual countries
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as a means of rewarding success, as long as it is based on some generally applicable rules. Thus, an EU
regional approach to the post-communist Balkans should in no way be interpreted as a means of
delaying the accession to the EU of countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, which are in this respect far
ahead of any other country in the region, although still quite a long distance from becoming full members.
In the process, the EU will need to rethink its European policy; to define new categories of associate (or
virtual membership); to draw some hard lessons from the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina; to assess
critically the efficiency of established programmes of dispensing aid to third countries; to invent flexible
management structures; and last but not least, to decide whether the treaty articles on the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are meant seriously or not. If the EU fails to pursue an active policy
in the Balkans, it is difficult to imagine where else it would successfully do so (see also Bildt et al, 1997).
Another general question which will need to be dealt with concerns the relationship between increasing
participation of the Balkan countries in European integration on the one hand and co-
operation/integration at the regional level on the other. There is certainly no incompatibility between the
two processes. On the contrary, they should be viewed as closely linked to each other and mutually
reinforcing; and the EU should ensure that they remain so.
Regional co-operation/integration is desirable for economic, political and security reasons. But given the
history of the region, it may have to proceed at a modest pace, at least initially, and even more so, as
long as final political settlements accepted by all parties concerned are pending, especially as regards
parts of former Yugoslavia. Past experience seems to suggest that the emphasis, at least in the early
stages, should be on low politics, thus offering large scope for the old Monnet method. One thing should,
however, be made clear: regional co-operation/integration can never be a substitute for integration in the
wider European system. The region is too small in economic terms4 and peripheral in geopolitical terms,
and none of the countries concerned would accept such an alternative.
Trade liberalisation should be a key component of the new EU policy towards the Balkans. Improved
access to trade can be more important than economic aid. Some immediate steps should include:
· As a minimum, the EU should offer tariff-free access for industrial exports from all countries in the
region. This is in fact very close to what already applies. This measure could therefore be decided
very soon (applicable from 1/1/2000?).
 
                                                
4 Although there is undoubtedly considerable scope for growth in intra-regional trade, the latter would start from a
very low basis indeed (see Table 3).
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· Free access for agricultural exports from the countries of the region will be more difficult to obtain,
given the highly protectionist character of the CAP. Liberalisation of agricultural trade is very
important, since farming represents a large share of total production in many countries of the region.
Liberalisation will, of course, depend on the pace of internal reform of the CAP. As a first step,
there should be a generous increase in agricultural export quotas offered to the countries in the
Balkans.
 
· There is now a big asymmetry in trade relations between the EU and individual countries in the
Balkans, as expressed by the large deficits incurred by the latter. There is also, arguably, an
asymmetry in terms of trade liberalisation between the two sides, working again at the expense of the
Balkan countries, because of the restrictions imposed by the CAP in agricultural trade. If anything,
this asymmetry needs to be reversed, in order to take into account the different levels of economic
development of the two sides. Thus, the timetable for trade liberalisation should allow some
breathing space for restructuring on the side of the partners of the EU. Admittedly, transition periods
for adjustment are not usually profitably used. Instead, they often provide a convenient excuse for
delaying painful decisions. However, immediate liberalisation of external trade in the Balkan
countries would further exacerbate the already huge problem of unemployment, while also leading to
the permanent closure of many inefficient firms, some of which could survive with proper and timely
restructuring. A clear timetable of tariff liberalisation extending to five (?) years should be adopted.
 
· Liberalisation of intra-regional trade should be applied more easily, thus leading to the creation of a
free trade are in the Balkans, which should become part of the wider European free trade area. This
could start from the year 2000. However, given the structure and size of individual countries in the
Balkans, the immediate prospects for growth in intra-regional trade should be relatively modest (see
Table 3). In the context of intra-regional trade, improved relations among the successor republics of
former Yugoslavia should allow for at least some part of the old intra-Yugoslav economic exchange
to start again. On the other hand, the growth of intra-regional trade, as well as trade with the rest of
Europe, very much depends on the improvement of transport networks.
In the world of mixed economies, and especially in the context of the EU and the preparation for
accession, trade liberalisation should be intimately linked with regulatory alignment (see also Majone,
1996; Tsoukalis, 1997). A great deal of the effort in preparing the 11 candidate countries for full
membership has been spent on the progressive alignment of national rules to the internal market acquis
on the basis of the White Paper of 1995. Thus, the candidate countries have been required to undertake
most of the regulatory adjustment prior to their accession; and sometimes, at a not insignificant cost for
them (e.g., environmental rules). The wisdom of this policy is under some doubt.
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Although the harmonisation of rules is an essential part of the preparation for EU membership – and this
should be clearly the long-term goal for all the countries of the Balkans – too much emphasis on it at an
early stage would be counter-productive, given the much lower level of economic and institutional
development of the Balkan countries. There is much basic institution building that will need to be done
first.
Euroisation could have great symbolic significance as a way of linking the Balkans with EMU and the
euro. The replacement of national currencies by the euro should, however, be a gradual process
extending over a period of ten years and allowing for different speeds to cater for the special
characteristics of individual countries. The progressive euroisation of the Balkan economies needs to be
accompanied by technical assistance, financial aid and a whole range of internal reforms, especially as
regards the financial sector.
Economic aid should be an integral part of the overall package to be offered by the EU to all the
countries of the region. The launching of the Stability Pact needs to be followed by sizeable financial
commitments on behalf of the EU and the other potential donors. The amounts committed until now are
almost exclusively directed at physical reconstruction in Kosovo. The European Agency for
Reconstruction (EAfR) should therefore take responsibility for the Balkan region as a whole, while also
adopting a wide definition of the term reconstruction.
The political decision to proceed with a comprehensive plan for reconstruction and regional co-
operation in the Balkans will need to involve substantial sums of money over a period of years. The EU
will have to operate within the budgetary ceiling of 1.27% of GNP until the year 2006. On the basis of
present projections of expenditure, this ceiling does, however, leave considerable margin for manoeuvre.
Given the small economic size of the region, even modest sums of money by EU standards would
represent very substantial transfers for the recipient countries; and there is, of course, a limit to their
absorptive capacity. At current market prices and exchange rates, the combined GDP of Albania,
Bulgaria, Romania and the successor republics of Yugoslavia (excepting Slovenia and Croatia) is smaller
than the GDP of Greece. In other words, it represents approximately 1% of the GDP of EU-15. Thus,
annual transfers of the order of 3-5 billion euros to the whole area of post-communist Balkans should be
within the limits of the budgetary ceiling of 1.27% for the period 2000-2006; and wisely used, this sum
could make a great deal of difference in the region. On the other hand, there is considerable scope for
additional funds to be made available in the form of grants from individual donors and loans through the
EIB and international financial institutions.
The efficient use of funds will require strict conditionality and continuous monitoring. This in turn implies
flexible management structures and a kind of operation which is human resource intensive on behalf of
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the donors. Thus, money will not be the only constraint. Lessons will have to be learned from the
experience of aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina: the large sums of money spent until now, when they have not
gone down the corruption drain, may have produced new bridges and schools. But they have hardly
succeeded in creating the conditions for sustainable economic development. The Commission will also
need to learn from its own experience in providing structural aid. The experience with aid giving through
the PHARE and TACIS programmes for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union leaves something to be desired.
What follows below is an indicative list of priorities for EU economic aid:
Top priority should be given to the improvement of public infrastructure, and especially transport and
telecommunications networks. Trade liberalisation both within the region and with the EU depends on it.
The plans for the pan-European corridors, as an extension of trans-European networks (TENs), are
already there. All the countries of the region now need to be involved in the process. The financing
should combine official grants, loans as well as other schemes relying more heavily on the private sector.
Today in the Balkans, infrastructural investment should be a powerful integrating factor, arguably the
equivalent of coal and steel in Western Europe in the 1950s.
Balance of payments aid should be primarily the responsibility of international financial institutions. On
the other hand, transfers through the EU budget should be directly linked to progressive euroisation and
the restructuring of the financial sector, which will be absolutely crucial for economic development.
Consideration could also be given to the EU undertaking part of the social security burden, especially if
this is linked to further restructuring and the laying off of workers. Furthermore, special attention should
be given to private investment and the generation of new employment, with particular emphasis on
new technologies and SMEs. EU grants in this area should be primarily aimed at reducing the high-risk
premium of new investment in the Balkans.
A major priority of EU aid should be the whole area of institution building. We have now learned from
bitter experience that weak institutions and non-transparent rules explain much of the painful and largely
unsuccessful transition of post-communist countries in the Balkans. Institution building should involve a
great deal of technical assistance from other European countries. Basic groundwork should be followed
by progressive harmonisation of rules in anticipation of EU membership.
Given the special characteristics of the Balkans, a good deal of EU aid should bypass central
governments aiming at the strengthening of the private economy as well as civil society and NGOs.  We
need to strengthen pro-democracy forces in Balkan societies, which may act as counterbalance to the
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centralising and authoritarian tendencies of the state, and also forces which may help to build bridges
across frontiers.
High consideration should be given to projects which extend beyond the frontiers of a single country,
thus helping to lay the foundations of Balkan co-operation and starting mainly in areas of low politics.
Transport, energy, telecommunications, water resources as well as visas, frontier control, drugs and
organised crime are some examples of the kind of areas in which there is rich scope for Balkan co-
operation, with the EU acting, when necessary, as a catalyst. Cross-regional training efforts and
corporate support programmes should also be given priority. Regional co-operation should go hand-in-
hand with closer integration of the Balkan countries in the EU.
Justice and home affairs already represent a significant part of EU legislation. The gradual lifting of
restrictions on the free movement of people between the EU and the countries of the Balkans will have
to be directly linked to an ever closer co-operation between the two sides, which should also include the
fight against organised crime and drug trafficking.
This finally brings us to institutional relations, which should aim at reconciling the new regional
approach of the EU with the traditional hub-and-spoke relation between the Union and individual
associate members. The new agreements to be signed with those countries of the Balkans, which do not
have as yet the status of associate and/or candidate member, should bring with them the institutional and
other benefits of association with the EU, including institutionalised dialogue at different levels and
gradual access/participation in different EU policies. The speed of integration of each associate member
will, of course, vary depending on the ability to meet clearly defined economic and political criteria. At
the same time, the new associate members, together with the old ones, will be invited to participate
actively in different manifestations of regional co-operation, in which the EU as such will also play a part.
The regional dimension of institutional relations should not be limited purely to low politics. It should also
include periodic meetings at the ministerial level as well as annual meetings of the heads of state or
government.
V. Conclusions
The Stability Pact is an immensely ambitious project. Most of the post-communist societies of the
Balkans are deeply disabled. Borders are disputed; the rule of law is weak or non-existent; hundreds of
thousands of people have been displaced from their homes and constitute a long-term source of
frustration and insecurity; several regimes are characterised by political extremism and disregard for
international norms, especially that in Serbia. The economies of the region are on the verge of collapse
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with high and unsustainable external deficits, high and increasing unemployment, and, in several cases,
with public finance close to bankruptcy. Productive capacity has been destroyed as a result of political
disintegration and above all war, and the financial sector hardly functions. In this context, the war in
Kosovo and the NATO bombing has left a trail of disasters with political tension mounting in
Montenegro, FYR Macedonia and inside Serbia, and further interruptions to trade and production. Both
Serbia and Kosovo are likely to face a humanitarian crisis this winter with inadequate power and heating
supplies.
In this paper, we have emphasised that the task of reconstruction is not only physical and economic, but
also social and institutional. In particular, we argue that a ‘bottom-up’ approach is required. It should be
aimed, first and foremost, at building and enforcing the norms and institutions required to guarantee the
rule of law and civil society. The goal is to provide a framework for normalisation of everyday life in
which seemingly intractable problems can be managed. Public security, respect for human rights,
employment opportunities, functioning health and education systems are all essential components of such
normalisation. We also stress the need for an integrative approach to the region as a whole and in
relation to the rest of Europe. Without a serious commitment in all fields simultaneously – security,
democracy and economy – the Stability Pact has little chance of success.
In the field of security, we argue that the international community has to fill the security vacuum until
permanent political settlements can be reached according to international law. This means a continued
presence in Kosovo and Bosnia and an enhanced presence in FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and
Albania, which may will be in the form of an international civil presence or an OSCE security presence.
Moreover, the international community has to develop the capacity for internal as well as external
security either through international policing or reform of local police and judiciaries. In the longer term,
proposals need to be developed for a regional security system which would reduce military spending and
control arms trade, integrate armed forces, eliminate paramilitary groups and criminal gangs, and
institutionalise mechanisms for conflict resolution.
We also argue that the key to the establishment of a rule of law is the strengthening of democratic groups
and individuals in society. The most important obstacle to the establishment of the rule of law is the
existence of undemocratic regimes led by extremist politicians linked in to networks involving security
services, criminal networks and paramilitary groups. These regimes should be sidelined; this is especially
important in Serbia where a distinction must be drawn between the regime and Serbian society. At the
same time, assistance should be provided to democratic opposition groups. It is also important to
support democratic developments in neighbouring regions, particularly Montenegro and Kosovo.
Throughout the region, the international community should promote civil society and the construction of
citizens’ networks, through municipalities, schools and universities, independent media, businessmen's
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associations, NGOs, and religious institutions. In particular, we propose that there should be a formal
citizens’ dimension to the Stability Pact.
Economic recovery and, in particular, increased employment opportunities and improved social security
can also help to provide the conditions for the rule of law and democratisation. We agree that trade
liberalisation both within the region and with Europe, stable currencies, as well as fiscal reform are
important for macroeconomic stability. But these measures will not work unless accompanied by an
injection of foreign funds and by microeconomic restructuring. The latter must be conceived as part of an
overall industrial strategy which includes the upgrading of infrastructure, especially telecommunications,
the development of the private sector including schemes for micro-credit and for investment insurance,
the restructuring of existing public enterprises, the reform of corporate governance, and local economic
development.
Finally, we believe that the European Union has a special responsibility for ensuring the success of the
Stability Pact because of its size, proximity, wealth and political importance. The EU model of integration
starting with economics and low politics can be fruitfully applied to the Balkan region. In particular, it is
very important that the EU improve the trade access of Balkan countries, including tariff-free access for
industrial goods and increased agricultural quotas. Trade liberalisation should be complemented with
substantial financial transfers on the basis of conditionality and subject to continuous monitoring. We
propose that the target for EU aid to the region as a whole should be of the order of 3-5 billion euros
annually, extending for a period of at last 5 years. The priorities for aid are public infrastructure, financial
restructuring, employment generating projects, especially new technologies and local development, and
institution building including public governance and civil society. As regards euroisation, we believe that
the conditions are not yet ripe. However, this should constitute a key long-term target for all the
countries of the region. The European and more specifically the EU vocation of the Balkans should be
clearly recognised and also translated in the appropriate economic, political and institutional terms.
Furthermore, European integration and regional integration should be seen as integral parts of the same
process.
A serious commitment to the region is important not just for the Balkans but for the whole of Europe.
The disintegrative processes that the Balkans have experienced are, unfortunately infectious. A genuine
effort to reverse those processes could provide the opportunity for the European Union to redefine its
basic mission. Indeed, it could be argued that the future of the European project depends on whether the
Union is able to rise to the risks and challenges posed by the situation in South East Europe.
* * * * * * * * * * *
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Table 3: Intra-regional trade: Exports and imports as % of total (1998)
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Table 1
Basic macroeconomic indicators (1998)
GDP Industrial
production
Consumer
Price Index
Unemployment Current
account
Czech Republic 95 79 11 8 -2
Hungary 95 103 14 10 -5
Poland 117 119 12 10 -4
Slovak Republic 100 79 7 16 -10
Slovenia 104 76 8 15 0
Bulgaria 66 48 22 12 -2
Romania 76 46 59 10 -8
Croatia 78 57 6 19 -7
Bosnia and Herzegovina 40 9 16 40 -50
FYR Macedonia 71 47 1 35 -8
FR Yugoslavia 52 46 30 27 -8
Albania 89 28 20 18 -12
Notes: GDP and industrial production are presented as indices where 1989=100. In some cases, retail prices are used instead of CPI.
Current account is presented as % of GDP.
Source: National statistics and WIIW Database.
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Table 2
Exports to and imports from some major trading partners (% of total, 1998)
E U G e r m a n y I t a l y R u s s i a
X M X M X M X M
Albania 89.7 75.4 8.3 8.5 59.5 41.8 0 0.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 51.6 41.8 19.0 14.9 22.7 11.9 0 0.5
Bulgaria 49.7 45.0 10.4 13.7 12.7 7.7 5.5 20.1
Croatia 47.6 59.4 16.9 19.3 17.7 17.9 3.6 4.8
Greece 52.6 63.0 15.4 14.1 10.1 17.4 1.0 1.3
Hungary 73.0 64.1 36.6 26.2 5.8 7.6 2.8 6.5
FYR Macedonia 47.6 55.5 20.5 15.1 10.4 9.4 2.2 0.1
Romania 64.5 57.7 19.6 17.4 22.0 17.4 1.0 9.0
Slovenia 65.5 69.4 28.4 20.7 13.9 16.8 2.6 1.8
Turkey 49.9 47.4 20.5 16.9 5.7 8.8 1.7 4.2
FR Yugoslavia 35.0 40.0 11.7 13.5 12.8 12.1 5.7 11.3
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; WIIW Database
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Table 3
Intra-regional trade: Exports and imports as % of total (1998)
  Albania B & H Bulgaria Croatia Greece Hungary FYR
Macedonia
Romania Slovenia Turkey       FR
  Yugoslavia
X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M X M
Albania .. .. 0 0 0 3.4 0 0.8 1.3 23.5 0 0.9 1.8 1.6 0 0.6 0 0.8 0 0 0 0
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 0 0 .. .. 0 0.4 29.0 29.5 0 0 0 5.5 0 0 0 0.6 8.6 14.0 0 1.6 .. ..
Bulgaria 0.6 0 0.3 0 .. .. 0.2 0.1 8.8 5.9 0.8 0.7 2.3 0.8 1.2 1.2 0.7 0.4 7.9 2.6 2.2 0.8
Croatia 0 0 14.4 1.9 0 0.1 .. .. 0.2 0.2 1.1 2.5 1.4 0.7 0.2 0.2 9.5 8.6 0.2 0.3 0 0
Greece 1.6 0 0 0 2.4 1.4 1.7 0 .. .. 0.5 0.3 0 0.4 1.7 0.7 0.2 0.1 4.1 1.2 0.8 0.1
Hungary 0.1 0 0.6 0 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.2 .. .. 0.1 0 2.5 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.2
FYR Macedonia 1.0 0.3 0 0 2.6 5.4 3.6 4.2 1.6 2.1 0.3 1.3 .. .. 0.3 0.3 3.3 9.0 2.4 4.9 9.6 12.0
Romania 0.1 0 0 0 0.9 0.4 0.2 0 2.4 1.7 2.6 4.6 0.1 0 .. .. 0.4 0.4 3.9 2.3 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 3.5 0.5 0.2 0.5 9 4.3 0.3 0.2 1.6 2.4 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.2 .. .. 0.6 0.4 1.1 0.7
Turkey 0.2 0 0.1 0 0.4 0.7 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0 0.3 0 0.9 6.9 0 0 .. .. 0 0
FR Yugoslavia 0 0 18.9 5.9 1.4 1.8 2.5 0.5 4.3 4.2 .. .. 9.3 6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 0 1.5 .. ..
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; WIIW Database
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